
RECOUNTING THE PAST

A Student Journal of Historical Studies at Illinois State University

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In memory of David Chesebrough and Lawrence McBride.

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**COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM, AND
STATE FORMATION IN
AFGHANISTAN: A CRITICAL
ACCOUNT**

Philip H. Karns

Afghanistan has been described at various times as a pure Islamic theocracy, a "rentier" state, a buffer state, a failed state, and even as a state without a nation. The goal of this paper is to analyze at least a few of the diverse and at times competing threads of reasoning in order to try to better identify how nationhood has been conceived and realized through history in present-day Afghanistan. It will also attempt to outline the pressures influencing the formation of a new post-Taliban state in present-day Afghanistan.

When starting this process there was concern that there would be a limited number of sources on this topic, but a sizable body of literature does in fact exist and is available to the average reader, though these sources are weighted especially toward the Indian/British perspective. Limited sources speak from an Iranian viewpoint, but very little is accessible (at least to this researcher) to address either the Russian or Afghan points of view. Primary sources only available internationally or in other languages might exist, but are beyond the scope of this project. Obviously the events surrounding September 11, 2001 have propelled the discussion of Afghanistan into the popular press and our academic discourse. However, there seems to have been a fairly constant level of scholarly interest in the Afghan nation over the years. A part of this seems to have been a fascination with the ebb and flow of events dealing with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This researcher has tried to pull relevant viewpoints and ideas from a variety of sources

while attempting to avoid the trap of simply surveying or summarizing the breadth and scope of Afghanistan's fascinating history.

Explorers and scholars examining Afghanistan are traditionally fascinated by its very "otherness." Though it has been invaded and occupied on several occasions, it has never been colonized. Though endowed with a reputation for fierce independence, it has never quite fulfilled many of the accepted tests of self-regulation associated with the model of a modern territorial nation-state. Geographically the land area of Afghanistan is dominated by the Hindu Kush range of mountains that rise in the Pamir region in the northeast and stretch to the southwest. Innumerable valleys and ridges twist and swell off of the backbone of the main range as it marches across the central and eastern thirds of the land. This name "Hindu Kush" means literally the "killer of the Hindus" since so many captives from south of the Indus River died when forced to march over the high passes in weather they were not hardened to. Likewise, the desert that dominates the western third of the country is called Dasht-i-Margo, which translates to the "Desert of Death." The Hindu Kush forms the watershed between the Indus and the Amu Darya basins and is part of the mountainous divide that separates southern from central Asia.¹

In order to help comprehend the political history of the country, it can best be thought of in four main geographic subdivisions, corresponding to major urban centers. Kabul in the east has been the capital throughout most of the modern period. Kandahar in the southwest was the traditional capital and home of the ruling Durrani. In more recent times it became the center of the Taliban movement. Herat in the west has been a trade and cultural center throughout the ages and the key to Persian influence and desires. The north is dominated

¹ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 2.

by Masar-i-Sharif, which is the center of Turkomen influence.

Origins of the Name Afghanistan and Outline of the Ethnic Makeup of the Region

The name first appears in writings traced back to the third century AD, and references in Muslim records of around the millennium make it clear that even since that point, the word *Afghan* was synonymous with the Pashtun, who make up the largest ethnic group, and about half the current population of 20 million. Ethnographers have identified as many as fifty ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan, but most sources settle on about twenty main groupings, with Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, Baluch and Turkoman being the primary groups after the Pashtun. They make up roughly equal shares of about half of the present population, and these ratios have remained fairly stable throughout recent history. The Pashtun are equally dispersed across the south and east of Afghanistan, and about an equal number live across the Durand Line in Pakistan. The Pashtun ethnic group can be further subdivided into clans or sub-tribes called *khels*, or are sometimes, like most Afghans, segmented into smaller groupings called a *qawm*, which can be roughly equivalent to a family or an extended family group, a village or region, or at times is used to denote groupings equivalent to political parties.² The Pashtun can be further subdivided into key sub-groupings such as the Durranis (formerly Abdahs) in the west and south, from which the Afghan Royal House is descended, and the Ghilzai, who live in the south-central area. The Pashtun in the east include the Wazirs, Afridis, and Mahsuds. A key aspect of Pashtun society is *pashtunwali*, a rigid ethical code that establishes strict obligations of revenge, hostility, sanctuary, and honor.³

² Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), 25.

³ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 5.

The Tajiks represent a unique position among the many minority ethnic groups. As a predominantly urban group, they make up a large number of the mercantile and artisan class and tend to be somewhat better educated. They have carved out a niche as a sort of bureaucratic class, and tension traditionally exists between their mid-level governmental power and the Pashtuns who traditionally hold the higher key leadership roles. Of course the many other ethnic groupings each have fascinating aspects but their detailed delineation is beyond our scope. It is important to note that despite their similarities as (for the most part) being all Sunni Muslims and speaking related languages, the various Afghan peoples (even clans and family groups) historically scheme, maneuver and feud among themselves as much as against outsiders.

The Myth of Inwardness of Afghanistan

On the surface, the in-fighting and feuding can appear selfish and backward, but on the other hand, Afghans share a strong faith and a devotion to freedom. Their self-sufficient lifestyle has evolved a homegrown style of democracy in the institution of *theyzrga*, a sort of town meeting where each adult male in the community has a voice in important decisions. Many scholars, including Richard Newell in his essay "The Prospects for State Building in Afghanistan," paint a rather bleak picture of a highly segmented, isolated, and "inward-looking" society.⁴ On the other hand, Fredrik Barth has responded to this viewpoint with his fascinating essay, "Cultural Wellsprings of Resistance in Afghanistan." Barth points out that the cliché of the "mud curtain" behind which the illiterate and closed-minded Afghan hides to reject progress has been formed by observers who are unwilling "to transport ourselves from where we stand to where they stand: Away from what we unconsciously view as the center of the

⁴ A. H. Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 109.

world—our own Western society— and over to where their world inevitably has its center, in the middle of Asia."⁵ Though most Afghans' formal education may be lacking, they are imbued with the sense that they are parties to world history on a grand scale. They stand at the crossroads of the world, traversed by caravans, migrations, and invading hordes.

The tribes of Nuristan maintain traditions (probably entirely incorrect) of descent from the troops of Alexander the Great, while the Hazara tribes in the central mountains claim to hail from Genghis Khan's Mongol armies. And all of them see themselves as contemporary actors on a world stage. With limited resources at home, it was always in a larger world that wealth and fame could be won: as conquerors of India or Persia; as labor migrants throughout the Indian subcontinent; as scholars influencing the entire Muslim world.⁶

Origins and Formation of Afghanistan

The modern political history of Afghanistan, like modern history for most of central Asia in general, can be said to commence with the death of Nadir Shah in 1747, which was followed by a period of destructive anarchy when his empire finally broke up completely. Since early in prehistory the place known now as Afghanistan has been a corridor for peoples finding their way to the riches of India. Each invasion or migration left a mark on the indigenous people of the region and their languages. In the eleventh century present day Afghanistan was the meeting point for three empires. The Persian Safavids, the Mughal Empire and the Uzbek Shaibauids all collided and occasionally overlapped along the seam of the Hindu Kush mountains. When

Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1747 his Persian empire disintegrated. Ahmed Khan returned to his native Kandahar and was elected Shah by *zjirga* of nine Adbali sub-tribes. He took the name Ahmed Shah Durrani and immediately began building his Afghan empire. He quickly conquered all the old Mughal lands and his empire included all of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as parts of Iran. Despite his military expertise, he was unsuccessful at administering his holdings. His empire gradually eroded as succeeding Durrani leaders jockeyed for ascendancy while India gradually reacquired the areas east of the Indus River. As anarchy gripped the Afghans, the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh grew in power and prestige, building his own Sikh empire. As British interest in India grew, the first tentative steps toward relations with Afghanistan were taken in the early years of the nineteenth century. In 1836 Dost Mohammed was recognized as Amir by the Pashtun. During this period, attention was beginning to be paid to the Southern expansion of Russia, whose frontier was still a thousand miles to the north, but whose officers and envoys were seemingly everywhere in central Asia.

The Forward Policy

Events spiraled out of control quickly in the late 1830s as Britain and the East India Company played Ranjit Singh off against Dost Mohammed for control of the Peshawar region. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, Russia responded by ramping up its movement toward the Khanate of Khiva.⁷ After two years of inconclusive warfare the British were finally driven from Kabul in a humiliating retreat in January of 1842. The misconception that only one British officer out of the 16,000 strong column made it out of the Kyber Pass has been hard to correct, but in truth several hundred survived the massacre as prisoners and were freed the

⁵ Rosanne Klass, ed., *Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited* (New York: Freedom House, 1990), 188.

⁶ Klass, *Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited*, 189.

⁷ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 47.

following year by the "Army of Retribution."⁸ The "forward policy" which led to the direct involvement in Afghanistan was reconsidered and the war resulted in a disengagement from the active approach. More importantly, it also damaged the trust Afghans felt toward Europeans in general, and the British in particular.

British Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics Impact Central Asia

British Afghan policy became an extension of British foreign policy. With the conclusion of the Sikh Wars British India now stretched from the Himalayas to the Khan of Kalat. The decade after the war saw a marked decrease in involvement, from both the British and the Russians. This "hands off" approach is sometimes referred to as "masterly inactivity."⁹ This approach seemed to work since the decade saw a period of détente in Anglo-Russian relations. With the start of the Crimean War in 1856 Britain renewed a more active stance in Afghanistan in order to offset any Russian encroachments. When the Indian Mutiny broke out in 1857, Dost Mohammed kept his part of the deal and resisted the temptation to try to take Peshawar and unite the Pashtuns once again.¹⁰

From Borderless Kingdom to Defined National Boundaries

The first serious step to define the actual borders of Afghanistan came out of a diplomatic effort by British Foreign Secretary Clarendon in 1869. As a liberal administration took power in London, a decision was made by the governments in both London and Calcutta to hold the Russians to a definite, fixed line on the map. The development Clarendon brought to the

discussion was the concept of the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of Britain and Russia. His goal was to prevent the two empires from ever sharing a common border, since this would reduce the chance for a serious clash growing out of some minor border dispute. The Russian Foreign Minister Gortchakoff emphasized that an intermediary zone was an acceptable goal, and that Afghanistan, as marked on the map supplied by the British Foreign Office, would be considered beyond the sphere of Russian influence. The Russians felt that this meant anything beyond the limits of Afghanistan was automatically theirs, while the British held the conception that Afghanistan should be neutral, while those lands adjoining it to the north should form this undefined intermediary zone. Confusion ensued for a while as the "Afghan problem" was dissected in St. Petersburg, London, and Calcutta. After some study, the India Council determined it "convenient" to have some understood geographic boundary.¹¹

The Oxus River was recommended as a easily defined border. The eventual Russia occupation of Bukhara and Kokand was implied in the decision. The river was seen as a good political demarcation since it avoided the issues of marking a border through desert or pasture lands. Chakravarty points out that this also displayed a "remarkable lack of insight into the social and political realities of central Asia. There were areas...where the two rival powers had overlapping jurisdiction and conflicting interests."¹² From this point forward the Afghan problem focused on defining the borders of the new buffer state in ever-finer resolution as the great empires pressed up tighter against its borders. By defining this northern border for Afghanistan, the Oxus also clearly denoted the southern-most limit for Russia, and the void was filled quickly, so the concept of the intermediate

⁸ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 50.

⁹ Suhash Chakravarty, *From Khyber to Oxus: A Study in Imperial Expansion* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1976), 12.

¹⁰ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 54.

¹¹ Chakravarty, *From Khyber to Oxus: A Study in Imperial Expansion*, 61.

¹² Chakravarty, *From Khyber to Oxus: A Study in Imperial Expansion*, 62.

zone between Russian and British India's Afghan neutral zone was lost.¹³ Malhotra makes an important point:

The interesting thing in this entire series of negotiations regarding claims and counter-claims on behalf of or against Afghanistan by the British and the Russians is that the Afghan Amir was completely unaware of what had been going on. The British had been advancing arguments on his behalf without his knowledge. They were negotiating the entire northern border of Afghanistan without the slightest reference to him.¹⁴

As a result of the treaty to end the war with Persia in 1857, Britain was obliged to arbitrate the division of the Seistan region between Persia and Afghanistan. The area had been in constant flux for over a hundred years. A carefully crafted settlement was reached in 1873 that established the Western limits of Afghanistan, which have survived to this day. This is a good example of the permanence attached to a defined border in our modern nation-state system. Once marked on a map, the numerous leadership and ideological changes in Iran and Afghanistan in over a century have failed to disturb this line.¹⁵

Scientific Borders and the Second Anglo-Afghan War

A scholarly discourse insisted for several years in the second half of the nineteenth century that a collision with Russia was inevitable, so preemptive steps should be taken to properly position India to confront Czarist colonial expansionism. The scientific frontier theory

held that India should establish a new border along the line of the Hindu Kush mountains, and that Afghanistan should be moved—forcibly if necessary—into the British sphere of influence. The return to a more aggressive forward policy spawned a short war in 1879. Amir Yakub Khan could offer little resistance to the British and Indian forces, and a quick settlement was reached in the Treaty of Gandamak in May of that year. Borders were not materially affected, but the British obtained certain key concessions from the Amir. The British would control the Kyber Pass and were allowed to return a permanent mission to Kabul. This was seen as a step to better monitor Russian activity in the region. Britain assumed control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs, but granted the Amir complete control over all internal matters.¹⁶

This situation represents the essence of the British dilemma: how could they influence without occupying, and when was it more affordable to subsidize an amir instead of paying the price of posting a garrison in a forward outpost? Subsequent Indian secretaries, viceroys, and foreign secretaries would juggle how to efficiently influence Afghan tribes while balancing at least an appearance of respect toward Afghanistan's status as a buffer state against the Czar's expanding empire. The "Afghan problem" and the costs and perceived dangers of the forward policy were key issues in the 1880 British elections. The critics of the recent war helped place the conservative party into power, and they quickly abandoned the forward policy.¹⁷

Amir Abdur Rahman, the "Iron Amir"

1880 also saw the selection of Abdur Rahman to lead the Afghan tribes. He was often called the "Iron Amir" who forcibly melded the loose collection of tribes into a unified kingdom with formally defined borders. In his published

¹³ The arrangement was formalized as the Clarendon-Gortchakoff Convention at Heidelberg in 1870.

¹⁴ Ravi Inder Malhotra, *Afghan Search for Identity: Frontier Settlements, 1872-1893* (Delhi: GDK Publications, 1982), 50.

¹⁵ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 59.

¹⁶ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 63.

¹⁷ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 67.

memoir he described his vision as "to substitute one grand community under one law and one rule."¹⁸ He was a ruthless leader who razed forts and demolished villages, brutally suppressed revolts, and forcibly relocated thousands of citizens in order to manipulate tribal loyalties. He claimed divine sanction for his rule, instead of the traditional consensus of *the jirga* process. He acquiesced to continued British control of his foreign relations because he saw it as the only way to counter-balance the perceived threat from Russian domination. Abdur Rahman was a shrewd ruler who realized the advantages of defined borders. He voluntarily surrendered hereditary claims to authority over vaguely defined regions and tribal areas in exchange for the security (and the annual subsidy payments, of course) that he gained by agreeing to the lines established by British commissions and cartographers.

The Northwest Region and Durand Line Commissions

The first major effort was the commission set up to clarify the northwest border area. This was where Russian expansion first contacted Afghanistan when the Russians annexed Panjdeh, a region arguably under loose Afghan control. The Amir had no desire to take a stand in the remote Panjdeh, but the issue forced the question of what exactly did constitute Afghan territory beyond any shadow of a doubt.¹⁹ The joint Anglo-Russian commission finished marking the northwest border in July of 1887.

In the same way that Britain looked at Afghanistan as a buffer state between India and Russia, the Indian leadership saw the Northwest Frontier territories as a buffer between the areas under colonial rule and the areas ruled by the Amir. Though the British had no real intentions (despite the rumblings of a few forward policy

thinkers) of extending the colonial frontier, they wanted to be sure the frontier peoples were not absorbed by the Afghans, either. Lawlessness and crime were major problems along this frontier. The people had no real source of income besides robbery, extortion and extracting tolls from travelers.²⁰ In 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand led the commission charged with the massive task of surveying, marking, and mapping the 1500-mile southern border of Afghanistan. Actually four different teams performed the task along separate sections of the border.

The Third Afghan War and Afghan Independence

The death of the Iron Amir in 1901 thrust Afghanistan into a period of modernization by his son and new ruler, Habibullah. He used as a model the example of Japan, which showed the successful blend of selective Western influences to modernize a traditional culture, while preserving the balance of the indigenous social and religious structures. His educational reforms cultivated the roots of the rural/urban divide that still exists. School reforms in the cities created an educated elite divorced from the village life of the vast majority of Afghans still imbued in the ethnic system. The struggle for nationhood could at least on the surface have been simplified by the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. The empires agreed to end their "Great Game" in central Asia and acknowledge existing borders, while Russia disavowed any lingering ambitions toward extending influence south of the Oxus. However, the agreement was signed without seeking Afghanistan's approval. The Russian threat seemed replaced by a renewed forward policy in the Northwest Frontier territories of India. Habibullah demanded total independence and complete

¹⁸ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 74.

¹⁹ Malhotra, *Afghan Search for Identity: Frontier Settlements, 1872-1893*, 63.

²⁰ Malhotra, *Afghan Search for Identity: Frontier Settlements, 1872-1893*, 77.

control of foreign relations, but he knew he was playing a dangerous balancing act.²¹

It would take until 1919 when Habibullah was assassinated and replaced by his son Amanullah for Britain to finally relinquish its claim to authority over Afghanistan's affairs. Amanullah was strongly influenced by the "Young Turks" and the Pan-Islamism movement in general. He was an anti-imperialist and eagerly sought the attentions of the Bolsheviks in Moscow. His reckless, impetuous nature caused him to immediately declare a jihad against the British and move his army toward the Kyber region. The called-for uprising in India did not materialize, and his goal to return the borders of the Afghan Empire to the Indus was defeated. The Durand line was reaffirmed as the border with India, but the Treaty of Rawalpindi did acknowledge that Britain relinquished all control over Afghanistan's foreign relations.²² Afghanistan had attained complete independence from British influence.

Soviet Expansion, The United States, and Cold War Influences

The "saltwater colonialism" of Great Britain and the other European nations, and the breakup of those colonies are the focus of the development of new nation-states during the twentieth century. The world largely ignored the Soviet (and earlier Czarist) empire building because it occurred in the vast interior space of central and northern Asia. The USSR had solid anti-imperialist credentials until the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which Ewans describes as "the single most damaging event since 1917" for the Soviets.²³ The Russians had managed to stand by the old agreements to honor the Oxus line as the limit of their influence, while their repeated overtures to provide aid and assistance

²¹ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 84.

²² Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 87.

²³ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, 151.

were rebuffed until the 1950s. The long line of conservative, pro-British amirs made occasional attempts to establish closer ties with the United States. While making some moves to modernize, primarily in the field of education, Afghanistan remained quintessentially conservative and pro-Western. Life changed little for most Afghans outside of the ruling elite and members of the bureaucracy. Poullada points out that American diplomacy (or more appropriately, the absence of it) frittered away an important political asset and opened the way for the Soviet economic offensive of the 1950s. During a conversation with President Truman, Afghan Prime Minister Shah noted: "The Afghan government tends to think of the loan as of political as well as of economic importance, possibly increasingly so in the light of Soviet interest and offers of assistance to Afghanistan."²⁴

In October 1954 the new Afghan Prime Minister Prince Mohammed Daoud sent U. S. Secretary of State Dulles a final appeal for military aid. Dulles not only demurred but also told Daoud to settle the Pashtun issue with Pakistan first. To add insult to injury, the State Department sent a copy of the correspondence to Pakistan. The Afghans were outraged by this "flagrant breach of confidence and diplomatic practice."²⁵ Just a month later, Daoud accepted a Soviet aid package. In 1955 the U. S. ambassador Angus Ward managed to get an assistance program approved, but the Helmand River Dam project was poorly executed and had only a fraction of the impact of the airports, roads, and bases built by the Soviets.

The Constitutional Period and the Soviet Invasion

In 1963 Afghanistan instituted a liberal constitution drafted by an American-educated lawyer, Mohammed Moussa Shafiq. Afghanistan was thrust full-tilt into an

²⁴ Klass, *Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited*, 41.

²⁵ Klass, *Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited*, 43.

experiment in parliamentary democracy. National elections were carried out by secret ballot, and broad human rights measures were prescribed, even for women. This was a huge step for a traditional Muslim state, and the gamble failed after ten years. A part of the reason for this failure can be linked to continued American indifference. In fact, in every year of the democratic experiment, American economic aid decreased.²⁶ In 1973 Daoud returned to power as the leader of a coup that toppled the monarchy and effectively ended constitutional rule. The situation gradually deteriorated as the various groups resisted his authority, and the Soviet Union increased pressure and influence until even its man Daoud was not compliant enough, and a new series of intrigues and coups culminated in a full-blown invasion on Christmas 1979. The invasion thrust Afghanistan into a 24-year spiral of insurgency, counter-insurgency, civil war and religious fundamentalism at the hands of the Taliban regime. The Soviet retreat after eleven bloody years of war contributed to the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union.

The Rentier State Model Theory

Barnett R. Rubin is the leading American scholar and expert on Afghanistan. In his recent book, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, Rubin has made an incisive historical analysis that clearly identifies the key elements of typical state formation and how these factors have failed in recent Afghan history. Based upon this analysis, Bahshi²⁷ wrote in 1999 that Pakistan was accomplishing a proxy conquest of Afghanistan by supporting the Taliban. Pakistan

was to provide the military muscle and arms, and Saudi Arabia and a consortium of oil firms the finances to establish a new Rentier State in Afghanistan.

Historically, over 85 per cent of the total Afghan population has been categorized as peasant or nomadic. Traditionally, this population has never paid taxes to any government. The struggle by states for control of tribal territories requires the transformation of autonomous tribes into tax paying peasants. Since the Afghan state was invariably dependent on foreign aid revenue from the British, it had no motivation to impose real control of the tribal areas and transform the tribes into tax paying citizens. Roughly 12 per cent of Afghanistan's total land area is arable, and several years of drought have reduced by about half the amount of this arable land that is under cultivation. The Afghan economy, historically, is a mix of agriculture and pastoral grazing. In recent decades war, mines, and refugee dislocation have further eroded the capacity of the Afghans to function at even a subsistence level. In simple terms, Afghanistan has always lacked an indigenous economic basis for viable state formation. Therefore, the Afghan state has been formed with the help of economic resources obtained from outside its borders, first as loot from adjoining richer areas of India and Persia extracted by tribal conquests, then by external military and economic aid provided by, first, Britain during the "great game" era, then by the Soviet Union during the cold war period. Most recently since the fall of the Taliban, the state has been supported by humanitarian relief from the United Nations World Food Program and nongovernmental aid programs such as CARITAS and the Red Crescent Society. This external aid has given the Afghan state the coercive means to weld the heterogeneous tribal society together by distributing the foreign largesse and playing one tribe off against the other.

Rubin points out that the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the central

²⁶ Klass, *Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited*, 53.

²⁷ G. B. Bakshi, *Afghanistan as a Rentier State Model: Lessons from the Collapse* (n.d.), <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-8.html>, accessed 20 April 2003. Bakshi is an Indian Army Officer writing in a professional paper regarding background and motives of Pakistani and U. S. foreign policy toward Afghanistan during the Taliban period.

Asian states, and then the discovery of huge hydrocarbon deposits radically transformed the situation. American and Saudi oil companies wanted access to the central Asian reserves of oil and natural gas. Rubin saw a new overland "Silk Route" in the pipelines to carry oil and natural gas across Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea from the new production fields of central Asia. This would have funded a new Rentier State in Afghanistan. The Rubin analysis suggests that tariff revenues to the Taliban for the flow of oil through its territory would make a new Afghan state at least economically viable. Pakistan saw an opportunity to regain its front-line status lost since the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan. As the conduit for arms and aid to the Mujahadden, Pakistan held a great deal of the cards in the new "Great Game." It was willing to establish a new Rentier State in Afghanistan based upon its new instrumentality, the rabidly fundamentalist Taliban. It also would have an impact as the terminus of any pipelines through Afghanistan.

Shortcomings in the Rubin Thesis

Barnett Rubin's analysis of Afghanistan as a Rentier State is well supported by history. The establishment of a new Rentier State in Afghanistan under the rabidly fundamentalist Taliban could have been facilitated by the reopening of the historic Silk Route through central Asia—this time for the flow of oil and natural gas. This possibly explains the motivation for Pakistan to have helped raise the Taliban militia from the refugee madrasas. The Saudis and the American oil companies enthusiastically came forward to bankroll this new Rentier State.³⁴ Heavy cash inflows helped to buy off all Pushtun opposition, and the Taliban had a free run. The Taliban, however, ran into trouble in the spring of 1997. Their eventual downfall was precipitated by their involvement with Al Qaeda terror movement, and was hastened by the U.S.-led coalition, but it would have probably faltered anyway. The Rubin analysis only stresses foreign capital and arms aid as the precipitating factor for state

formation in Afghanistan. The Taliban probably would have floundered for several reasons, even if the pipeline could have somehow been completed. Rubin did not adequately take into account the ethnic fault lines that fueled the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The Tajik and Uzbek were united with several smaller groups against the Taliban. Bakshi also states that there was a lack of charismatic leadership. No forceful leader such as Amir Abdur Rahman was emerging to weld the tribes together. Finally, there was a lack of a credible military force. Many of the Taliban's early victories were made by buying the allegiance of other groups, not by battlefield success. It also does not account for the moral challenges of funding the Taliban. The question is does the current Karzi regime meet these tests in order to succeed? Certainly there are concerns about the ability of Karzi to mobilize popular support and serve as a charismatic figure who can unite the various groups. Also, the new Afghan National Army does not yet possess the ability to operate on its own, even with the aid supplied to equip and pay the new force.

Rubin and Bakshi fail to account for the involvement of narcotics trafficking in the Taliban or post-Taliban periods to serve as an economic base for the individual Afghan farmer, or the Taliban as an active participant in this trade, as the Soviets and DRA regimes had been before them. The impacts, both monetary and social, on narcotics trafficking for the Karzi government will be crucial to monitor. Opium production is not being actively suppressed yet since it is one of the few cash crops available. To eradicate it could drive even more Afghans off the land and potentially back to the Taliban as a source of support.

An Iranian Perspective

Iranian film-maker Mohsen Makhmalbaf has made two documentaries about the plight of Afghanistan in recent years. He offers a unique perspective. Though his article was written prior to the Global War on Terror and the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the U.S.-led coalition in

Afghanistan, his comments are still applicable. The madrasa schools and the system of Taliban supporters have not been eradicated. Involvement by the Pakistani security service, the ISI, seems very likely. At the same time, other parts of Pakistan's government do appear to be trying to capture terrorists to hand over to U.S. custody. While the Karzi administration struggles to exert control, many poor Afghans might still be drawn to see extremism and the Taliban as a viable alternative. Makhmalbaf points out that Afghanistan is in many ways a victim of her own topography. The mountains have provided protection from foreign invasion, but they also block interaction with other cultures and commercial activities. Being a country that is 75 percent mountains has problems creating consumer markets in its potential industrial cities and in exporting agriculture products to the cities. In the past Afghanistan was a passageway for caravans on the Silk Road traversing China through Balkh and India through Kandahar. The discovery of waterways and then airways in the last century changed Afghanistan from an ancient commercial route into a dead-end. The old Silk Road was a passage of camels and horses and did not have the characteristics of a modern road. The highways that are there are poor, and in the mountains road construction is expensive. Most routes are little more than narrow paths for smugglers.

The fact that some find Afghanistan as a museum of tribes, races and languages is because of its geography and sheer difficulty. Every tradition in this country has remained intact because of isolation and lack of interference. It is only natural for this rough and dry country (with only 7 percent of its land being used for agriculture of which half is threatened by drought) to turn to cultivation of poppy seeds to support its people. If the conditions are normal and the price of bread does not increase, from all this poppy wealth, the basic

question then comes to mind as to how the Afghan people are supported. It is either through construction work in Iran, participation in political wars or becoming theology students in the Taliban schools. In these schools anybody can have a piece of bread and a bowl of soup, read the Quran and memorize prayers and later join the Taliban forces. This is the only remaining option for employment. It is the result of this geography that emigration, smuggling and war remain as occupations. That is why Pakistan created the Taliban: to have covert control of Afghanistan and stop the Afghans from demanding the cession of Pashtoonestan.²⁸

Makhmalbaf says that Iranians view Afghanistan as, essentially, an offshoot of their early civilization and empire that has broken away. They for the most part view their Sunni religion and strong tribal affiliations as backwardness caused by centuries of isolation. He describes how Iranians see their neighbors to the east as a source of cheap labor, but also a source of refugees, who bring diseases and turmoil at times. Afghans are seen as good manual workers, but are somehow not quite equal players in the region.

Conclusion

All states in history, whether traditional states, empires, city-states and federations of towns, as classified by Anthony Giddens, included a core organization that fought and taxed. The political form of modernity is the territorial nation state. To be viable, a state has to exercise effective control within its prescribed territory. Today the successor entity of those

²⁸ Mohsen Makhmalbaf, *Limbs of No Body: World's Indifference to the Afghan Tragedy*. The Iranian: Opinion, June 20, 2001, <http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2001/June/Afghan/index.html>, accessed 20 April 2003.

loose empires, city-states and town federations is the modern nation state. Tilly defines nation states as "those governing multiple, contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated and autonomous structures." Max Weber lists some of the characteristics of a nation state as:

- (a) Compulsory association on a territorial or legal basis.
- (b) An administrative and legal system subject to legislative change.
- (c) A monopoly on the use of force.

In contrast to these indicators, Afghanistan has a sizable nomadic population and large numbers of its residents have allegiance to clans outside of the recognized borders. The legal system has been dysfunctional for 24 years, and every male resident is armed either for protection or as a member of a local militia, so the embryonic national military has no monopoly on the right of violence.

The key feature is that established nation states have governmental systems to penetrate society and impose controls in a comprehensive manner. The state draws its economic resources by taxation of the economic activities within its borders. In tribal societies like Afghanistan, however, the state has to contend with the tribe for the loyalty of its citizens. At no time in recent history has the Afghan state been able to comprehensively penetrate the tribal society and put in place its systems of controls.

Afghanistan, according to Rubin, has always been a rentier state, dependent on limited support rather than on the production of goods and services by its citizens. Beyond this, it may be accurate to classify Afghanistan as a "military-rentier" state, since the aid it has received has always been predominantly weapons, or the money to buy arms, or funds to pay mercenary forces hired from regional tribes. Increasingly, the aid Afghanistan accepted was either in the form of military material and training, or was spent on arming the force the leaders used to keep their tribal subjects in check at the expense of social modernization or

infrastructure improvements. The experience of the Great Game led Afghanistan to view European powers and European innovation as mainly military. Military capacity kept Afghan leaders in power, and it was military power they pursued. As noted by M. Nazif Shahrani, "In the limited modernization of the army, weaponry, and government-sponsored industry, the Afghan monarchy found the means to strengthen its own power over the tribal and religious leadership and to create a politically and economically united country."²⁹

Is Afghanistan a "Failed State"?

It is hard to seriously contest the argument that Afghanistan is a failed state. It is certainly hard to see where it has succeeded. As a monarchy it was incessantly bullied and manipulated. First, the colonial powers fed into this Afghan system. The Great Game solidified the geopolitics of the region as the Russian and British empires replaced the fluidity of tribal territoriality with firmer borders backed by substantial and modern European armies. Against these forces, loot-seeking border raids rapidly became unattractive to the Afghan tribesmen. Afghan leaders resorted to the aid offered by the Great Powers. Aid payments became the new tribute to be distributed in tribal allowances and financed the armies Afghan leaders used to maintain their power. The military force required by Afghan rulers to maintain control over their own populations was purchased at a cost of European political patronage by its Great Game neighbors. It was close at times to being annexed entirely or broken up into a collection of weak provinces by Russia or Britain. A slightly different mix of personalities or policies in St. Petersburg, London, or within the Indian colonial government could have led to a radically

²⁹ Jen Keister, *State-Building and Modernization: The Negligible Effects of Colonialism in the Great Game*, <http://www.wm.edu/SO/monitor/spring2002/keister.htm>, accessed 20 April 2003.

different interpretation or execution of the forward policy, which could have had drastic results. The "scientific border" theory meshed with the early Russian interpretation of the inhospitable heights of the Hindu Kush as the logical and natural place to delineate a break between spheres of influence. Instead, a careful balancing act ensued.

Afghanistan certainly made one of the key steps toward nation-state status by achieving fairly well defined borders over a century ago. The borders negotiated by Abdur Rahman have survived through several major upheavals, but has Afghanistan achieved nation-state status? In many ways it may have been closest to this goal during the period from the 1930s until the 1950s. During those decades the Afghan monarchy experienced a measure of self-sufficiency and independence from outside influences. Since independence in 1919, the monarchy had tolerated gradual educational reforms and limited modernization measures. The 1930s saw the fascination with the "Young Turks" and some very poorly conceived steps toward Western models. Of course, the vast majority of the Afghan people would have noticed little difference, and the degree of "modern" development might have been very limited, but in the context of external threats and control of their destiny, this period stands out. Soviet influence was present, but not overpowering.

The unfortunate reality is that the situation changed for Afghanistan because of lack of involvement by the United States. To borrow a phrase from the "Great Game" era, the foreign policy of the U. S. exhibited a form of "masterly inactivity" by rebuffing repeated overtures from several Afghan leaders over the post-WWII and Cold War periods. American failure between 1946 and 1954 to respond to the genuine economic and security needs of a friendly and pro-Western Afghanistan and to understand the internal political imperatives of the "Pashtunistan" problem set the stage for the successful Soviet penetration of Afghanistan,

letting the Soviets make increasing inroads into affairs until the full-fledged invasion became a reality. In essence, Afghanistan held a position as a nonaligned nation during the period of 1945 to 1979. The failure of several American administrations to appreciate the real political (and humanitarian) opportunities, and an obsession with Pakistan at the expense of Afghanistan contributed further to the problem. Though it may have had some shortcomings when evaluated against the standard of a Western nation-state, Afghanistan certainly had the potential for continued peaceful change and development. Unfortunately, the downward spiral of the Russian invasion and strife of 24 years of external and internal war and turmoil have undone nearly all of that promise. What remains are the strong local connections of most Afghans for their homes, and the territorial integrity of the old borders. Given these as a starting point, President Karzi has the challenge to rebuild the political, governmental, and military structures necessary to take them from a failed condition and establish a viable nation.

Afghanistan is definitely the "land of the Afghans." The romantic image of Afghanistan is richly deserved. It is the crossroads of central Asia and holds the key to the possibility of a new Silk Road from the EU to Asia. It is impossible to deal with the history of Afghanistan in isolation since it has constantly been reacting to the pressures exerted by the march of ancient peoples from the north, the ambitions of Persia to the west, or later the twin encroachment of British and Soviet empires from both the south and north. Afghanistan served as the natural buffer between these empires and continues to carve out a position in a rugged, inhospitable part of central Asia.

COALITION AND COMPROMISE: DAVID LLOYD GEORGE AND GERMAN REPARATIONS

Matthew Husky

Since the fall of David Lloyd George's Coalition Government in 1922, a residual feeling of distaste for coalitions has prevailed in the United Kingdom, and the former Prime Minister himself came to be viewed as a shady and immoral character. It was indeed a rare thing this Welshman attempted, for Benjamin Disraeli once commented that England dislikes coalitions.¹ The Coalition Government was forged at the end of the Great War toward the close of 1918, and shortly thereafter the British Prime Minister traveled to Paris to negotiate the most monumental peace settlement since the Congress of Vienna. At London in the House of Commons and at Paris in the Council of Four, Lloyd George attempted to unite bitterly opposed interests: Liberals with Conservatives, Americans with the French. His approaches to both national and international politics were similar, yet both failed to achieve their central goals. The Liberal party was destroyed, and the Great War did not prove to be the war that ended all wars.

In both instances David Lloyd George attempted through coalition and compromise to forge a balance between the divergent elements at home and abroad over the question of reparations for Germany. Part of the motivation for these actions was anxiety over the leftist extremes within

Britain and abroad. Lloyd George attempted to outmaneuver the Labour party, which possessed socialist tendencies. Meanwhile, during the conference the threat of Bolshevism loomed in the minds of all the delegates, resulting in a hurried process of peacemaking. Yet even more crucial were simply the differences of British opinion regarding the reparations issue. These found reflection in the conflicted political aims of Lloyd George's government that simultaneously wished for fair and just treatment of the defeated Germans and for punitive economic sanctions.

A great deal of research has sought to understand what went wrong with the Versailles Treaty, because the rise of Hitler and the devastation of World War II obviously indicate that President Woodrow Wilson's vision of a settlement to end war failed. Historians have placed a lot of the responsibility on Wilson's shoulders for his adamant refusal to compromise with the Senate, or on the conniving actions of vindictive Republicans thwarting American ratification and entry into the League of Nations. But even before the treaty found itself debated on the Senate floor, it had already been the subject of much disagreement and hardly reflected the objectives of the Fourteen Points. Lloyd George, heading the British Empire delegation, tried to navigate a middle path between a Wilsonian and a Carthaginian peace, which only resulted in a hypocritical treaty. This approach reflected the Prime Minister's strategy in domestic politics and is a key feature accounting for the ultimate failure of the Versailles Treaty.

The Coalition Government, formed shortly after the First World War, continued the wartime coalition established in 1916. Prime Minister Lloyd George called for new Parliamentary elections, which were held in December of 1918. The Parliamentary elections were held because of a number of

¹ Kenneth O. Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), vii, 7-8.

factors: the franchise had increased considerably since the last election in 1910, there had been no elections during the war, and Lloyd George hoped to receive a strong government mandate and strengthen his position at the conference. He sought support from all the major parties: Labour, Conservative, and Liberal. The Labour party, however, had decided by a majority not to support the Coalition Government. His coalition ran on a platform of disarmament and an international league, but despite this he possessed limited support from his fellow Liberals. In his memoirs, Lloyd George carefully drew a distinction between himself and Wilson, because unlike the President in the American elections of the previous month, the Prime Minister appealed to all parties, not just his own.²

Despite his non-partisan appeals, the Liberal party was fractured beyond repair. According to Lloyd George the break in the Liberal party rested on the shoulders of the previous Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. Lloyd George insisted that Asquith had earlier led a coalition with Conservatives that compromised Liberal principles, but his own coalition of 1918 did not. Yet Lloyd George's coalition received most of its support from Conservatives; a good many Liberals refused to back him. Although Asquith lost his seat in the Commons after the 1918 elections, members of Parliament still loyal to him maintained a steady opposition to the new Prime Minister. Lloyd George viewed the break as personal and one that permanently damaged the party, as evidenced by the failed attempt to reunite the Liberals in the 1923 elections.

² David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*. Two vols. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1939), v. 1, 95, 97-98, 100, 105; Seth Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), 39.

Asquith undermined the Liberal party, Lloyd George claimed.³

David Lloyd George himself had a long history of coalition politics by 1918 and had already led a wartime coalition government for two years. As early as 1910, he began to propose a coalition government because of the perceived shortcomings of Asquith's government. Lloyd George agitated for compromise and coalition to obtain immediate action, and he wanted to forge a government devoted to social reform that excluded the Labour party. Conservatives like Arthur Balfour took note of the proposals, thinking Lloyd George was not too devoted a Liberal. In late 1916 Lloyd George took part in deposing Asquith and ascended to the office of Prime Minister. This process had begun earlier in the year when Lloyd George urged the creation of a new War Cabinet to combat the inefficiency of Asquith's war effort. Conservative Party leader Andrew Bonar Law presented Asquith with the Conservative demand that he step down as Prime Minister. Asquith resigned, convinced that he was indispensable and believing the Conservatives would refuse to have Lloyd George or Law as the Prime Minister. Asquith had made a fatal miscalculation because the Conservatives ended up supporting Lloyd George, as they wanted to reorganize the war effort and because Law had already backed him.⁴ Thus, by 1916 Lloyd George headed a coalition government as Prime Minister, with crucial support from Conservatives.

When forging his coalition at the close of the war in 1918, Lloyd George hoped to obtain a more cooperative Parliament. He saw Labour as the major threat to the Coalition Government. A gulf between

³ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 101-02, 106, 108.

⁴ Martin Pugh, *Profiles in Power: Lloyd George* (London: Longman Group, 1988), 51-54, 94-97; Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity*, 10, 12.

Asquith Liberals and Lloyd George Liberals began to grow when Asquith refused to support him during the elections, and Liberals still loyal to the ousted Asquith continued this opposition. Meanwhile, the Conservatives considered jettisoning Lloyd George but decided against it because of the uncertainty of the political climate (particularly regarding the strength of the Labour party). In addition, the Prime Minister was quite popular with the war having so recently ended. Eventually the Conservatives dispensed with him in 1922—he could scarcely remain in power without any actual party behind him. He had little to work with after the break with Asquith and became the captive of Conservatives like Bonar Law.⁵

American journalist and Wilson biographer Ray Stannard Baker recounted that the Prime Minister, as a result of all these political intrigues, found himself caught between Liberals, Labour, and socialist fringes on the one hand and Conservatives on the other hand. The former groups stressed improved trade and cooperation, whereas the latter hoped to crush Germany as an economic rival.⁶ Or, as British diplomat Harold Nicolson described the result of the “khaki” election, Lloyd George’s government was “menaced...by conspiracies both from the right and from the left. The former...were all for a peace of victors. The latter...were clamouring for immediate demobilisation.”⁷ Nevertheless, Lloyd George wrote in his

⁵ Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 137; Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity*, 15; Pugh, *Lloyd George*, 97-98, 123-25, 129.

⁶ Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*. Three vols. (Gloucester, Mass.: Doubleday, 1922, 1960), v. 2, 280-81.

⁷ Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939), 19.

memoirs that the victory over Asquith and Labour allowed the government “to ignore the elaborate efforts made by a section of the Press to... [grant] excessive leniency to Germany.”⁸ At the conference Lloyd George had to “cope with the tortured nationalism of France, [and] with the mystic and arrogant republicanism of America.”⁹

At the end of the First World War, British opinion lay divided over the issue of what sort of peace should follow. Although a few Labour and Liberal candidates appealed for charity towards Germany, the Conservative bulk of Lloyd George’s coalition carried the day. A statement by Conservative candidate William Joynson-Hicks captured the prevailing wind in Britain when he cried, “After all the blood...shed the pacifists should [not] be allowed to whittle down the peace terms and let Germany off the stern punishment which she deserves for her cruelties and barbarities.” Even the more moderate Liberal R. J. Morrison “deems it to be of the greatest national importance that such terms of peace shall be imposed on the enemy as will compel the payment of a complete indemnity for all damage caused.”¹⁰ The Lloyd George coalition triumphed by an immense margin with obtaining reparations from Germany as one of its foremost objectives.

Lloyd George himself made statements that demonstrate his effort to appeal to both sides of a conflicted electorate. In a speech the day of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, he “affirmed that we could not forget the reckless wantonness with which the rulers of Germany, with the full assent of their people, had permitted this atrocious crime against humanity.”¹¹ After this tone of harshness, one can also detect the very

⁸ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 110.

⁹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 20.

¹⁰ *The Times*, Dec. 5, 1918, 14.

¹¹ *The Times*, Nov. 11, 1918, 8.

next day a strand of charity for the Germans: “We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire, to over-ride the fundamental principle of righteousness.”¹² The ambivalent attitudes of the British as a whole, reflected in these statements, lay at the center of the approach of the British government to the Paris Peace Conference negotiations of 1919. President Wilson on one occasion described the British delegation as “made up of every kind of British opinion.”¹³

Lloyd George in particular had to deal with the conflicted desires of the British public. He catered to a vindictive electorate; although he initially denied British claims to reparations from Germany, he later changed his stance at the conference. In his memoirs, Harold Nicolson described it this way: “We find him [Lloyd George] stating that Germany must pay for the whole cost of the war.... [This was the result of] patriotism on the part of his supporters... [and] *The Times*.”¹⁴ Nicolson was more forgiving of the people, commenting that “it would be unfair to accuse the British Public of a lack of civilisation merely because, during their first few months of convalescence, they demanded that the peace also should be unremitting and harsh.”¹⁵ He placed the responsibility on Lloyd George as a leader instead of the general populace.

As the conference approached, reparations emerged as one of the largest and most controversial issues. The victorious coalition included them as a central feature of their platform for the peace settlement. Lloyd George contended

in his memoirs that Britain’s war aims implicitly included reparations as early as “Mr. Asquith’s historical deliverance of the 9th of November, 1914: ‘We shall never sheathe the sword...until Belgium recovers...all that she has sacrificed.’”¹⁶ The official British declaration of war aims in 1917 included “restoration, reparation, self-determination, disarmament and some means, other than war, of establishing and enforcing justice amongst the nations.”¹⁷ Yet Lloyd George stressed that “such payments must be limited...by Germany’s capacity to pay.”¹⁸

Lloyd George had more latitude on the issue of reparations than his course of action during negotiations with the Conservatives when forming his coalition would suggest, because the Conservatives who desired reparations had no alternative partner. Because the Conservative Party supported Lloyd George for the coalition during the 1918 elections, he was their only option for Prime Minister. All other candidates were from parties of the left, which opposed the very idea of reparations. Therefore, Lloyd George would have had Conservative backing regardless; he did not need to take any sort of action in pursuit of their support. He decided, however, to cater to those persons caught up in anti-German prejudice and insisted upon reparations for Britain. He reversed his position rather than exert his authority as leader of the government.¹⁹

When the conference began the reactions to President Wilson indicated the divided views of the British delegates because of the kind of peace he represented: fair, just, and non-punitive. Harold Nicolson, a firm apostle of Wilsonism, stated in his memoirs that “in the main tenets of his [Wilson’s] political philosophy I believed with fervent

¹² Quoted in Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 21.

¹³ Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. Sixty-nine vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966-1994), v. 60, 71.

¹⁴ Pugh, *Lloyd George*, 126-27; Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 22.

¹⁵ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 59.

¹⁶ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 291.

¹⁷ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 25.

¹⁸ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 23.

¹⁹ Pugh, *Lloyd George*, 128.

credulity. In spite of bitter disillusionment I believe in them to-day.”²⁰ Despite all of his grand ideas, Wilson’s condescending attitude elicited hostile reactions. Sir James Headlam-Morley, a British diplomat concerned with the territorial settlements of the treaty, observed “how very strong a feeling of distrust and opposition he [Wilson] creates.”²¹ This, coupled with Wilson’s own inflexibility, proved disastrous. Nicolson went on to say, “He possessed ... no capacity for adjustment [He was] incapable of withstanding criticism as of absorbing advice [He was] blind to all realities which did not accord with his preconceived theory.” As Nicolson recalled, other participants at the conference took advantage of Wilson’s vanity and faith in democracy; “President Wilson was destroyed, not by his faults but by his virtues.”²²

Lloyd George had a mixed reaction to the American President. He at first experienced irritation at the President’s condescending attitude and demeanor. In his memoirs, he described Wilson as an unknown quantity for the Europeans. “Whilst we were dealing every day with ghastly realities on land and sea...he was soaring in clouds of serene rhetoric.” The former Prime Minister continued in the vein of describing Wilson as an idealist disconnected from reality whom the Europeans viewed with suspicion. “He [Wilson] shunned the sight or study of unpleasant truths that diverted him from his

foregone conclusions.” Stressing Wilson’s deep religious convictions, Lloyd George described Wilson in his memoirs as “a missionary whose function it was to rescue the poor European heathen from their age-long worship of false and fiery gods.” The Prime Minister retorted that Europe did not need Wilson to teach them the ideals for which they fought and “that he was too proud to fight for.”²³

Over time the delegates became used to Wilson’s manner, and Lloyd George did admit that he had “a more detached and therefore a calmer view of the problems.” The Prime Minister admired Wilson’s radicalism and eloquence, but preferred a man of action such as Theodore Roosevelt; he viewed Wilson as “more hesitant and timorous.”²⁴ Admiral Cary Grayson, the President’s doctor who accompanied Wilson to the conference, recalled a very flattering remark made by the Prime Minister about the President:

I never have found—in fact, there can be no one anywhere in the world—who is fairer and squarer to all parties than President Wilson. He is a man of tremendous ability and judgment and poise, a real statesman and one who seems to care nothing for politics. I have pointed out to him in considering several questions, how he could help himself politically through certain moves. He declared that they did not interest him at all. He is never swayed into taking a stand on some question that would benefit him politically....Wilson is a statesman and never a politician.²⁵

²⁰ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 36.

²¹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 79, 192, 196; Arthur Walworth, *Wilson and the Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1986), 142; Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant, and Anna Cienciala, eds., *Sir James Headlam-Morley: a Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919* (London: Methuen & Co., 1972), 31.

²² Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 94, 198.

²³ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 139-141.

²⁴ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 142-44.

²⁵ Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, v. 60, 303.

Yet regardless of the reactions he elicited among the delegates, President Wilson was plagued by the fate of his party during the 1918 midterm elections. The Democrats lost control of Congress, particularly the Senate, which was now headed by Wilson's old rival, Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that would play a crucial role in the debate over the necessary Senate approval of any treaty created. In the end, of course, the United States never ratified the Versailles Treaty and subsequently never joined the League of Nations.

Wilson once commented during the conference, "Nothing has to be explained to me in America, least of all the sentiment of the American people."²⁶ However, as Nicolson so eloquently put it in his memoirs, "The tragedy of the American Delegation in Paris was that they represented something which America had felt profoundly in 1915....They did not, however, represent what America was feeling in that January of 1919."²⁷ All the delegates at Paris realized that Wilson would lack the necessary Senate votes for ratification. Nicolson thought it would have been preferable if the American President had not attended the conference in person: "[H]ad he remained in touch with Senatorial and public opinion, [he] might have been able either to guide that opinion...or else warn his Delegation."²⁸ Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau had strong government mandates; Wilson did not. The outcome of the American election damaged the President's authority, and this allowed the other delegates to obtain concessions from a reluctant Wilson, with France, Italy, and to a lesser extent Britain, taking advantage of his weakened

position.²⁹ In the words of Lloyd George, the 1918 election "undermined the prestige of the President and... proved to be a world catastrophe, for it severed America from cooperation with the victors in establishing the kind of peace which he himself had laboured so hard to achieve."³⁰

Uncertainty and delay marked the beginning of the Peace Conference. Throughout the accounts of those involved one consistently finds references to crucial unanswered questions. Would the Conference be a preliminary Allied agreement on terms followed by negotiations with the Germans, or would the terms be final and imposed upon the defeated power? Should the treaty be based on the Fourteen Points, and if so how would those principles be applied to the practical considerations of Europe? If the idea of national self-determination were applied to the territorial settlements, how would minority rights be protected against the tyranny of the majority? Further, who is entitled to self-determination?

As the negotiations progressed, one finds that different nations applied Wilson's principles unevenly to further their own interests. The European delegates used Wilson's weak position from the Democratic defeat of 1918 to their advantage. Italy joined the Allied side, despite its official alliance with Germany, because of its designs to gain territory. France sought to ensure its security by weakening Germany, since much of the fighting in the west took place on French soil. The French even put forth a proposal that in essence rejected using the Fourteen

²⁶ Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, v. 55, 419.

²⁷ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 58.

²⁸ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 71.

²⁹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 93, 199; Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, v. 1, 99; Arthur Walworth, *America's Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1977), 272; Walworth, *Wilson and the Peacemakers*, 143.

³⁰ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 91.

Points as a basis of the settlement, but Wilson's and Lloyd George's opposition thwarted this effort. Delays plagued the conference, as Wilson was in Europe for an entire month before the proceedings began in January.³¹ In the words of Headlam-Morley, "Owing to certain faults of organization, the delay at the beginning, and the haste at the end, there has never been time to get the whole treaty reviewed from the point of view of the general situation."³²

Perhaps the most significant and well-known portion of the Versailles Treaty in its final form was the demand that Germany pay reparations. Lloyd George worried that Wilson would only allow compensation to Britain for ships sunk while France got most of the reparations. Therefore, General Jan Smuts, a British delegate from South Africa, devised a solution demanding compensation for widows and families. Germany's clear aggression justified reparations. "The trespasser can in honour be held responsible for repairing the devastation wrought by him, or for paying the costs incurred by the wronged in securing justice." Wilson agreed to this demand. Lloyd George later claimed he did not take these actions simply to obtain popular support, although they nevertheless had that result. Through pensions, Lloyd George gained a larger share of reparations for Britain and kept his constituents happy by the exclusion of a specific figure. Although the Prime Minister did want to punish the Germans, he had no desire to crush them economically in consideration of the interests of British trade.³³

In this vein, Lloyd George stressed the need to estimate Germany's capacity to pay reparations and to use such a figure as a guide for Allied claims. The task of formulating these estimates fell to economist John Maynard Keynes and other members of the British delegation. Lloyd George and Wilson skeptically regarded the estimates based on the pre-war German economy, with Wilson commenting that "Germany no longer exists." Keynes and his colleagues put forward various figures. Lloyd George claimed in his memoirs that the French demanded £30 billion, the British £12 billion, and the Americans £6 billion. Historian Margaret MacMillan, however, gives figures of £44 (\$220) billion, £24 (\$120) billion, and £4.4 (\$22) billion for the French, British, and Americans, respectively.³⁴

Keynes left the conference disgusted by the imposition of crippling reparations on Germany. In his scathing work, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, published shortly thereafter in 1920 (written more from memory than documentation), Keynes offered his own estimates of what the Allies should have demanded from Germany. For Belgium he estimates a reasonable claim of \$2.5 billion, for France \$4 billion, Great Britain \$2.85 billion, and the other Allies \$1.25 billion—in all a modest total of \$10.6 billion. Although other analysts might challenge the accuracy of his calculations, he contended that any reasonable sum demanded of Germany would lie between \$8 billion and \$15 billion.³⁵

³¹ Walworth, *America's Moment 1918*, 271-72; Walworth, *Wilson and the Peacemakers*, 3-4, 141; Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 95-103; Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, v. 1, 97-99.

³² Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, 125.

³³ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 288, 329; Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed*

the World (New York: Random House, 2002), 186, 188-90.

³⁴ Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, v. 56, 289-90; Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 295-96, 300, 310, 332; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 184.

³⁵ John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 134-35.

Despite Wilson's wish to include a specific figure in the peace treaty presented to Germany, the delegates eventually decided that the League of Nations should create a Reparation Commission to determine such figures two years hence, after current passions had calmed. Ultimately Wilson's lack of interest in economics, along with British support for Italy's and France's demand for extravagant reparations, undermined the moderate American position on reparations.³⁶ Keynes displayed his disgust with the conference when he described the demands for reparations "to be one of the most outrageous acts of a cruel victor in civilized history."³⁷

While the delegates debated details, another concern plagued the Paris Peace Conference: preventing the spread of Communist revolution in central Europe. Early in the conference, Wilson, with Lloyd George's backing, urged France to allow aid for Germany lest it fall to Bolshevism. This red scare to some degree affected the outcomes of the elections that occurred during the fall of 1918. One can interpret the American and British elections as conservative responses to the leftist threat (with similar occurrences in Italy and France). Conservative politicians saw the newly created Soviet Union as a threat to their national interests. The elections of 1918 put into power conservative governments that severely hindered the efforts of Wilson and Lloyd George.³⁸ The threat of Bolshevism lingered as the delegates continued to work on drafting the Versailles Treaty. Worries about political

turmoil sped up the conference by April, which included the brief secession of Bavaria from Germany and the emergence of a Communist government in Hungary. Concern over the events in the East caused the other delegates to make Wilson address more immediate issues rather than focus so exclusively on the League. The sense of upheaval produced a rushed and hurried treaty with the different Allied nations pursuing conflicting ends.³⁹

By March and April the negotiations had progressed beyond the preliminary stage. In May the Allies presented the treaty to the German diplomat, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau. From the outset the Germans raised a number of objections to various terms, above all the highly despised war guilt and reparations clauses. Now the issue arose of how the treaty should be altered to accommodate German protests. Many in the British delegation viewed the settlement as too harsh; in the words of Headlam-Morley, "Reasonable and fair modifications proposed by the Germans should be frankly and openly accepted. There are in fact a certain number of modifications which I think that we ourselves ought to put forward." Lloyd George worked to improve the treaty, partly from fear that the Germans might refuse to sign it.⁴⁰

The treaty possessed numerous problems, in part because the drafters had devoted more attention to minor details rather than larger issues. Wilson knew it was a disappointment, yet he displayed little concern over whether or not the Germans signed the treaty. Wilson stated, "The treaty which ends so terrible a war must

³⁶ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 338-40; Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, v. 56, 452-53; Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, v. 2, 282-83, 324; Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, 229.

³⁷ Keynes, *Economic Consequences*, 168.

³⁸ Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking*, 7-10, 13-14, 119.

³⁹ Walworth, *America's Moment 1918*, 271, 273; Walworth, *Wilson and the Peacemakers*, 142, 201, 377.

⁴⁰ Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, 119, 135; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 192-92; Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, 344.

unavoidably seem harsh towards the outlaw who started the war, but when the details are read and understood I believe that the impression will be largely removed.” He also said,

I have no desire to soften the treaty, but I have a very sincere desire to alter those portions of it that are shown to be unjust, or which are shown to be contrary to the principles which we ourselves have laid down....[I]f the reparations clauses are unjust because they won't work—not because they are putting the heavy burden of payment upon Germany (because that is just)—but because...they cannot pay, then...we ought to rectify that.⁴¹

Because the Germans were responsible for the war, Wilson was not concerned if they did not sign.

Nonetheless, Lloyd George panicked at the idea of renewed hostilities and worked at granting concessions to the Germans. Wilson earlier had focused on including the League Covenant in the settlement and compromised a great deal to ensure this; he adamantly defended all compromises once they had been reached. The Fourteen Points had been thoroughly undermined, and in that last month he essentially mediated the disputes between Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Lloyd George worked to alter the reparations and territorial settlements and even the clause denying German entry into the League of Nations.⁴² Here he seems to have doubled back from his earlier standpoints. Lloyd George now struggled to

soften the treaty that, months earlier, he insisted be harsh in its demands for reparations.

In the short-term, the treaty was probably well-received in Britain, as Lloyd George pointed out in his memoirs. Despite criticisms of a few particulars, many Britons felt the treaty was harsh but fair.⁴³ But the schisms of British opinion had not totally vanished. After the signing of the Versailles Treaty, a sense of guilt and doubt began to grow among the British. Over time, particularly by the 1930s, this led to a great deal of sympathy with Germany—the essence of Appeasement.⁴⁴ Yet the reception of the treaty in Britain was nothing compared to the political war that raged across the Atlantic. Wilson sought but failed to secure the Senate's ratification of the treaty with a two-thirds majority. Wilson's health soon collapsed, and by 1920 the Republicans regained the White House.

In many ways the Versailles Treaty was a disappointment to those who believed in Wilson's doctrines. The treaty was hypocritical, although not necessarily by design. Nicolson points out that “nineteen out of President Wilson's twenty-three ‘Terms of Peace’ [fourteen points, four principles, and five particulars] were flagrantly violated in the Treaty of Versailles as finally drafted.”⁴⁵ Headlam-Morley wrote, “Looking back, the whole impression seems to me, from a political point of view, to be disastrous. The one thing which was forced on one by the whole scene was that it was the revenge of France for 1871.”⁴⁶ Keynes expressed a similar sentiment when he said, “Clemenceau's aim was to weaken and destroy Germany in

⁴¹ Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, v. 58, 205, v. 60, 67-68.

⁴² Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, v. 60, 488; Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, v. 2, 48; Walworth, *Wilson and the Peacemakers*, 377-78, 380-81; Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 358.

⁴³ Lloyd George, *Memoirs*, 487-90.

⁴⁴ A. Lentin, *Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), x.

⁴⁵ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 13, 187.

⁴⁶ Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, 178-79.

every possible way.”⁴⁷ Such interpretations are rather extreme; Clemenceau’s vision of peace was actually more moderate than that of other French statesmen. At the Paris Peace Conference there were three principle approaches: the French desire for vengeance and security, the American desire for peace and prosperity, and the conflicted British desire for vengeance and peace.⁴⁸

All scholars of this subject grapple with the question of “What went wrong?” Why, twenty years after the signing of the Versailles Treaty, did Europe again find itself in a devastating, continent-wide war? Many treatments exaggerate the role of Wilson or his weakened domestic position. The treaty possessed far too many flaws for American involvement in the League of Nations to have made an effective difference. The Versailles Treaty was neither the grand American vision of Wilsonian peace and justice, nor was it the vindictive suppression of France’s mortal enemy, Germany, which had robbed them of territory forty-eight years earlier. The treaty instead reflected the contradictions of British public opinion, their craving for indemnity and their hope for justice. Lloyd George’s confused and unclear position attempted to reconcile these conflicting objectives; British guilt stemming from the gratification of ephemeral desires led to Appeasement.⁴⁹

The very nature of negotiations for a peace treaty is one of compromise. Keynes described the Versailles Treaty as “a compromise between the Prime Minister’s pledge to the British electorate to claim the entire costs of the war and the pledge to the contrary which the Allies had given to Germany at the Armistice.”⁵⁰ As Nicolson put it, “There was no middle path between a

Wilsonian and a Carthaginian Peace. They [the delegates at the peace conference] should have realised that either was better than a hypocritical compromise.”⁵¹ Nevertheless, David Lloyd George did attempt to compromise. Neither the American nor French objectives were achieved: war did not end for all time, and Germany conquered France a generation later. Throughout his political career, Lloyd George attempted to reconcile vastly opposed camps through coalition and compromise. Just as he sought to unite Liberals and Conservatives in the British government, so too did he try to combine the conflicting goals of Wilson and Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference. Both efforts were motivated in part by anxiety about the socialistic inclinations of the Labour party and the Communist upheavals in central and eastern Europe. Neither effort proved very successful as he found himself deposed as Prime Minister in 1922, and witnessed as an old man the most devastating war in history. For as admirable as compromise may be, there are times when it is simply impossible.

⁴⁷ Keynes, *Economic Consequences*, 150.

⁴⁸ Lentin, *Guilt of Germany*, xii-xiii.

⁴⁹ Lentin, *Guilt of Germany*, xii-xiii.

⁵⁰ Keynes, *Economic Consequences*, 156-57.

⁵¹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, 95.

ON PROTESTANT TEMPERAMENT AND CHILD-REARING PRACTICES: THE LIFE OF JONATHAN EDWARDS

Amy Chen

Philip Greven, in his book *The Protestant Temperament*, describes three different styles of child-rearing common in colonial America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These three categories—the evangelical, the moderate, and the genteel—represent the severity with which parents reared their children in light of both disciplines and punishments. Correlating these categories with the degree to which parents held true to their Protestant beliefs, Greven describes their ways of thinking and child-rearing: the evangelical were “Authoritarian” (strict disciplinarians), the moderates were “The Self Controlled” (more temperate and flexible) and the genteel were “The Self Asserted” (fond affection over conscientious discipline).¹ Greven asserts that while evangelicals held fast to religious rules or codes of behavior, including the practice of self-denial and strict obedience in the home, the genteel were more secular, or liberal, in their thinking and thus more indulgent in their ways of dress, manners, and lifestyle concerning their children. This was seen by moderates as carelessness in parenting because “the genteel spoiled their children and failed to discipline them properly.”² Moderate parents, of course, would fall

somewhere in between the two categories as they delineated moral boundaries for their children, like the evangelical did; at the same time they acknowledged a greater sense of a child’s need to exercise self-will, similar to the genteel.

The focus of this paper will be on the category Greven calls the evangelical temperament, as applied to the life of one of the most notable figures of the Great Awakening, Jonathan Edwards. Born on October 5, 1703, to Timothy and Esther Edwards, the famous preacher contributed a great deal to the body of knowledge that exists today concerning theology and Calvinistic thought as related to the scientific discoveries of his time. There is more primary source material on Edwards’ theological work and his personal ideas on Christian discipline than there is evidence of the closeness of his family life. Therefore, Greven extrapolates meaning from Edwards’ writing and applies it to his methods of child rearing. Thus, he exaggerates our perception of Edwards as a black-and-white evangelical even in his family life and child-rearing practices.

Nevertheless, Greven shows that evangelicals were invariably concerned with the piety and humility of their own behavior and their children’s behavior. He does not mention, however, or at least makes faulty assumptions concerning, the motives behind why they lived according to such strict guidelines. In doing so, Greven does not sufficiently connect evangelical child-rearing with their spiritual lives and their relationship with God. It will be the aim of this discussion to show that evangelicals displayed love for their children through their more rigid child-rearing practices. Further, in the case of Jonathan Edwards, the element of his vertical relationship with God should be taken into account when evaluating the nature of his horizontal

¹ Philip Greven, *The Protestant Temperament: Patterns of Child-Rearing, Religious Experience, and the Self in Early America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), x, 12-14.

² Greven, *Protestant*, 276.

relationships with family members and his child-rearing practices.

To begin, it is important to summarize the ways in which Greven presents evangelical child-rearing. Starting from the influence of the elders to the daily habits imbued by the parents, and lastly going into the influence of parentage on the infant, we will see that there are a number of arguments or theories that Greven may have glossed over, or at least left for readers to connect for themselves. This paper has two broad themes, the first being the parental influences that Edwards was raised with in his childhood, and the other, Edwards' relationship with God and how it affected his own life and his relationships with his children.

The first part of Greven's work on evangelical child-rearing shows parents as rigid and exacting in their expectations. He states:

Within the confines of the nuclear family, children found no alternatives, no defenses, no mitigation, no escape from the assertion of power and the rigorous repressiveness of their parents.³

In addition to this, Greven describes how even the extended family, as well as servants working for the family, could be a hindrance to true discipline. Evangelical parents had to cope with grandparents who indulged their grandchildren and with the influence of servants in the household (probably depending on their own upbringing) who could also cause the children to be less attentive to their parents' wishes and desires. Greven describes evangelical parents' thinking on this issue:

Grandparents, like servants, could be dangerous. It would be best to keep

them at a distance – either spatial or emotional – to ensure that children were not corrupted. Their presence within the household could only complicate and confuse relationships between parents and their own immediate offspring.⁴

When taking into account Edwards' family, however, it is doubtful that his parents would have somehow wanted to assiduously prevent his grandparents from influencing their family life. In fact, Greven portrays Edwards and his grandfather, the influential theologian and minister Solomon Stoddard, in such a way that reflects their common beliefs and faith in God. As such, one cannot hesitate to think that his grandfather had some degree of influence on Edwards' childhood. Greven quotes Stoddard as saying, concerning the salvation of man and being born-again, that it is a "great change, from darkness to light, from death to life, from the borders of despair to a spirit of faith in Christ." In the same paragraph, he cites Edwards on the same topic:

"They that are truly converted are new men, new creatures; new, not only within, but without; they are sanctified throughout, in spirit, soul and body; old things are passed away, all things are become new...."⁵

It is conceivable that the Edwards family may have tried to keep his grandparents at a distance so they as parents could have the kind of authority they wanted over their children. At the same time, however, it is ironic that Greven poses both Edwards' view on conversion and his grandfather's on the same page when just earlier he had

³ Greven, *Protestant*, 25.

⁴ Greven, *Protestant*, 27.

⁵ Greven, *Protestant*, 62.

asserted how “dangerous” the outside influence of grandparents was and how “corrupted” the children could become because of their presence in the family. However, we may also be comparing more of a generational difference between Edwards’ childhood and his adult life, based on his lifestyle, with pious devotion and strict restraint in eating, drinking, and dressing habits. The nature of his relationship with his grandparents is also somewhat sketchy. That is, did Stoddard, or his other grandparents, for the benefit of this discussion, have a direct influence on what Edwards ate, drank, how he slept, how much he studied? Or, what kind of impact did his grandparents have in his life outside of his theology? In spite of these observations, the different sources consulted in this work had little, if any, specific information about Edwards’ relationship with Stoddard; these are perhaps questions that can be a matter of further research in light of Greven’s theory of the evangelical temperament. The fact remains, however, that because Stoddard himself was such an influential preacher, the evidence of Edwards’ personal faith in God beckons the question: how instrumental was his grandfather in disciplining or training his grandson in spiritual matters?

Moreover, it is clearly documented that Edwards tried to be as disciplined as possible in his daily habits; this was most likely the result of parental influence. Edward M. Griffin, in *Jonathan Edwards*, states that Edwards was raised by an “intelligent, willful mother and a demanding father” and that they “surely exerted great psychological pressure upon him.”⁶ Greven notes that to evangelicals, “What one ate, how much one ate, how one dressed, and how one behaved mattered profoundly.”⁷

⁶ Edward M. Griffin, *Jonathan Edwards* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 6.

⁷ Greven, *Protestant*, 43.

Edwards was said by one of his students to be “very strict and exact” in his diet, living by rule and practicing “great self-denial.”⁸ It comes as no small surprise, then, that the same methodical ways that Edwards was raised carried over into his own household. He himself also brought up eleven children. Greven explains:

Of the children in the Edwards family, it was said that ‘In their manners, they were uncommonly respect[ful] to their parents. When their parents came into the room, they all rose instinctively from their seats, and never resumed them until their parents were seated; and when either parent was speaking, no matter with whom they had been conversing, they were all immediately silent and attentive.’⁹

Clearly, the above shows the respect with which children held their parents and how well trained they were in their manners and in their speaking. Their behaviors were the result of training by their parents. Individuals, such as Jonathan Edwards himself, also practiced self-denial in eating and dressing. What Greven fails to emphasize, however, is the reasons behind practicing these outward disciplines. Edwards wrote:

Being sensible that I am unable to do anything without God’s help, I do humbly entreat him by his grace to enable me to keep these Resolutions,

⁸ Philip Greven, *Spare the Child: The Religious Roots of Punishment and the Psychological Impact of Physical Abuse* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 136.

⁹ Greven, *Protestant*, 47.

so far as they are agreeable to his will, for Christ's sake.¹⁰

Here, we see that Edwards' initial goal in making his Resolutions, written in 1722 at the age of 19, was to completely depend on God's strength so long as what he committed to do was "agreeable to his will." His attitude challenges what Greven would have thought might occur in the evangelical household, that is, rebellion as the result of harsh discipline. Rather, Edwards' Resolutions surely reflect an upbringing that, while it may have been strict, advocated sincere humility and submission to God's authority. More than just an outward show of piety, Edwards wanted to live his life to please God through these Resolutions, and to show his love for him by doing so.

Greven probes deeper into the evangelical mindset of child rearing in a section entitled "Embryo-Angels or Infant Fiends?" Here, he discusses examples of how evangelicals treated their children, that is, with affection and warmth, but also cites Edwards' theological view of infants. According to Edwards in *The Great Awakening*, infants, like any other individual with wayward hearts and wills of their own apart from the grace of God, were deserving of eternal punishment. He felt that this truth should not be kept from them lest they, too, suffer the consequences of unbelief. He states:

As innocent as children seem to be to us, yet if they are out of Christ, they are not so in God's sight, but are young vipers, and are infinitely more hateful than vipers, and are in a most miserable condition, as well as

¹⁰ "The Resolutions of Jonathan Edwards," at <http://www.jonathanedwards.com/text/Personal/resolut.htm>; accessed 9 April 2003.

grown persons; and they are naturally very senseless and stupid . . . and need much to awaken them. Why should we conceal the truth from them?¹¹

As harsh as this view may sound, it is important to not focus on Edwards' calling children "vipers" and even "more hateful than vipers," as Greven does, but rather to consider the thinking behind his last statement, "Why should we conceal the truth from them?" Edwards means that the truth of the Christian principle concerning salvation does not only apply to those that are older or wiser, but that even children are also in need of the redemptive grace of God through Christ. Beyond the graphic portrait that he paints concerning their sinful nature, Edwards states his belief in their ultimate need. Greven would agree that evangelicals did not punish merely for the purposes of dictatorship, but out of care for their children. He comments that "Indeed, it was because they did love their children so much that they cared so intensely about what became of them not only in this life but, even more, in the life to come."¹² In Greven's text, this point comes as an afterthought, although the Gospel message of love and forgiveness was central to these evangelical Protestants.

As we can see, parental influence has its place in the lives of children, but as Harold P. Simonson reflects in *Jonathan Edwards: Theologian of the Heart*, because a child is raised by evangelical parents does not guarantee their salvation or that they will necessarily grow to become people of similar piety and humility:

¹¹ Greven, *Protestant*, 31, cites Jonathan Edwards in *The Great Awakening*, C. C. Goen, ed., (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 394. Italics added.

¹² Greven, *Protestant*, 31.

Lineage, however, never satisfactorily explains genius, nor does it fully account for a child's predilections, such as Edwards' practice when only a boy of seven or eight to retire to a secret 'booth' he built in the swampy woods outside East Windsor and there, with certain schoolmates, to pray and 'spend much time in religious conversation.'¹³

Indeed, at an early age, certainly earlier than many others, Edwards found religion deeply interesting. His *Personal Narrative* does not mention the influence of his parents in his conversion experience. He does not say that he would retire into the woods to meet with God under compulsion of his parents, or even because he wanted to emulate any kind of practice by his grandfather, Solomon. The next portion of this paper, then, will posit a different approach to evangelical child-rearing and temperament in showing that the methods of child-rearing were displayed not because parents sadistically enjoyed a sense of power over their children and wanted them to obey their every word in fear, but because they did fear and love God.

The fear and love that drew Jonathan Edwards to his knees in his *Personal Narrative* was written around the age of thirty-six. He describes his own personal encounter with God and the ways in which he felt moved to surrender his life to the person of Jesus Christ. After going out into the woods, as he did on other occasions for the purpose of contemplation, he felt the presence of God:

I had a view that for me was extraordinary, of the glory of the Son of God, as Mediator between God and man, and his wonderful, great, full, pure and sweet grace and love, and meek and gentle condescension. This grace that appeared so calm and sweet, appeared also great above the heavens. The person of Christ appeared ineffably excellent with an excellency great enough to swallow up all thought and conception ... which continued as near as I can judge, about an hour; which kept me the greater part of the time in a flood of tears, and weeping aloud.¹⁴

After such a dramatic conversion experience, it is understandable why Edwards, as a parent, would have higher expectations and wishes for his children, because of the very real and endearing ways in which he felt God related to him personally. Surely, he wanted his children to live their lives according to the will of God as he understood it. In taking into account the revelation of his own sin and brokenness, and realizing that God was worthy of his very life and breath, Edwards dedicated his life to living biblically, a life to which he felt called. This can also be seen through his many *Resolutions*, as referred to earlier, each one being a course of action which would make him a better representative of Christ. He committed himself to read these resolutions once a week and eventually came up with seventy of them, concerning better speech, temperance, thought, and action. In his own words, Edwards wrote:

¹³ Harold P. Simonson, *Jonathan Edwards: Theologian of the Heart* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), 18.

¹⁴ "Personal Narrative of Jonathan Edwards," at <http://www.chosunjournal.com/edwards.html>; accessed 20 March 2003.

It appeared sweet, beyond all expression, to follow Christ, and to be taught, and enlightened, and instructed by him; to learn of him, and to live to him. Another Saturday night (January 1739) I had such a sense, how sweet and blessed thing it was to walk in the way of duty; ... I could not but, as it were, cry out, 'How happy are they which do that which is right in the sight of God! They are blessed indeed, they are the happy ones!'¹⁵

Although the details concerning his family relationships outside of the *Narrative* seem a bit sketchy, we can see how Edwards' parents influenced him as evidenced through a number of his journal entries. Through them, it will be seen, again, that Greven's perceptions of evangelical child-rearing seem a bit one-sided when taking into account the affectionate ways in which Edwards related to his children, including Esther Edwards Burr and Jonathan Edwards, Jr. Ultimately, it can be seen that Edwards was a man who, beyond the categorization that Greven imposes upon him as an evangelical, strove to live a life that exemplified the calling that he felt from God as a Christian, one where the love of God could be displayed in his relationships with his children.

To elaborate, it is ironic that Greven includes many different accounts of Edward's life concerning his relationship with God, but he frames his journal entries and the accounts we have of his personal life in such a way that it undermines our ability to see that it was his relationship with Christ that took preeminence, and his relationships with others were secondary, if not an extension of his love for God. This can be seen in the relationship he had with his

daughter when they discussed spiritual things. Before this, though, an examination of Greven's biblical interpretation of punishment will be seen; later, it will be shown that Edwards exemplified the idea of loving sacrifice in his relationship with his son.

Greven's *Spare the Child: The Religious Roots of Punishment and the Psychological Impact of Physical Abuse*, which he says is the sequel to *The Protestant Temperment*, focuses solely on the evangelical method of child rearing. That is, Greven explores how harsh punishments affect the child, the religious reasons behind such punishments, and their eventual ramifications on the well-being of children. He states, "We now need to recognize the sources and the reasons for such persistent physical punishment of children in the name of love and reason."¹⁶ One of the criticisms that Greven brings to light in *Spare the Child* is that evangelicals disciplined their children by following God punishing, and eventually putting to death, His own son Jesus on the cross. What Greven fails to account for is the reasoning behind God allowing His Son to be crucified on the cross—because of His supposed love for the world, for the salvation of man and the redemption of sins. Not once is it recorded in the Scriptures that Jesus committed any kind of sin, whether it was internally in thought or externally in action.

God's love was what Edwards was in tears about, and this was surely why, if at all, Edwards was motivated to discipline his own children – for the sake of the Gospel that was based in love, the instrumental force behind the Great Awakening. Even if what Greven describes as harsh discipline in the evangelical lifestyle may have been difficult for Edwards' children to accept, he himself was able to see the benefit of his parents' counsel and wisdom. This must

¹⁵ "Personal Narrative of Jonathan Edwards."

¹⁶ Greven, *Spare the Child*, 5.

have encouraged him to be a parent who would have the same kind of godly influence, based on the nature of his convictions.

We are fortunate enough to have access to Edwards' journals, in which we are able to see a man reflecting on his life in relation to himself and relation to God. Since there are very few mentions of specific relationships, it is surprising that he does mention his parents in one brief entry from May 1723, at age 20:

I now plainly perceive what great obligations I am under, to love and honor my parents. I have great reason to believe, that their counsel and education, have been my making; though, in the time of it, it seemed to do me so little good. I have good reason to hope, that their prayers for me have been, in many things, very powerful and prevalent, that God has, in many things, taken me under his care and guidance, provision and direction, in answer to their prayers for me. I was never made so sensible of it, as now.¹⁷

Here, we are able to glean a sense of the relationship that Edwards had with his parents. Edwards says of his parents' "counsel and education," that it seemed to do him so little good, and this agrees with Greven's thoughts on the effects of evangelical child-rearing. What Edwards concludes, however, is that his parents' advice and counsel benefited him, as well as did their prayers for their son, a point, while

mentioned, is not emphasized in Greven's work.¹⁸

How many other children raised in evangelical households have come to the realization that what their parents did for them as children in their discipline was ultimately for their good? Further, if they were to go without any kind of punishment, would they eventually be treated more severely for any wrongdoing in the future because they had not been disciplined as children? Greven makes a number of biblical references in *Spare the Child* but fails to include or emphasize the ultimate verse that points to why God gave up His son on the cross for the sins of mankind. He asks:

One of the most perplexing questions confronting many Christians is surely this: if the Israelites' Jehovah was also Jesus' Father in heaven, as most assume, did he then apply his harsh discipline of the rod and demands for obedience to his own only son?¹⁹

For Greven, John 3:16 NIV would obviously undermine his argument: "For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life." In this case, the punishment that Christ endured on the cross was a sacrifice so that others could live; for evangelical parents, the punishment of children was a sacrifice on their part so that they could teach them how to live better lives.

In another entry from 1723 dated on Friday, July 19, Edwards makes reference to 1 Peter 2:18 – "Servants, be subject to your masters, with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the forward: How

¹⁷ "Diary – May, 1723 By Jonathan Edwards" at <http://www.jonathanedwards.com/text/Diary/May1723.htm>; accessed 9 April 2003. This site contains Jonathan Edwards' diary, subtitled "Back in East Windsor with Travels to Norwich and Boston."

¹⁸ Greven, *Protestant*, 59.

¹⁹ Greven, *Spare the Child*, 50.

then, ought children to honor their parents.”²⁰ This shows that, the evangelical temperament of child rearing notwithstanding, Edwards nonetheless found a biblical basis to obey the authority found in his parents. This perhaps shows that beyond what it meant for his relationship with his parents, his obedience and submission to them was an outward act of his obedience to God.

It is somewhat unfortunate but we probably know more about Edwards’ inner life than we do concerning the nature of his relationships with his children. Esther Edwards Burr, however, wrote many letters to her friend, Sarah Prince, as mentioned in Ned Landsman’s *From Colonials to Provincials*. She found a great deal of comfort engaging in conversation with her women friends. Though she was like her father in wanting to continuously improve upon her spiritual and moral life, Landsman explains that their relationship was not as close, or at least not as close as she may have wanted it to be. When she did confide in him about spiritual matters, though, Esther evidently found him to be generous in love and goodwill towards her. She writes: “What a mercy that I have such a Father! Such a guide!”²¹

This statement bears significance to us in the aspect that Esther found mercy in her Father. The exact context to which she is referring is, according to Landsman, the “state of her soul.” Whether it be her responding to his care for her after doing some wrong, or if she was simply confiding in him to seek advice about her family is not clear; however, this “mercy” can only help us understand Edwards as a parent. He brought his daughter a sense of consolation, not grief; understanding, not judgment;

²⁰ “Diary – May, 1723 By Jonathan Edwards.”

²¹ Ned C. Landsman, *From Colonials to Provincials: American Thought and Culture 1680-1760* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), 141.

counsel, not reprobation. This connects with our discussion earlier, that although Edwards was aware of children being “vipers,” his conclusion that children, too, should know the truth of the gospel is conveyed in his relating to Esther in this way and comforted her in her trials. The message of the gospel that he preached was evidently put into practice in his family life, and the mercy he showed in his family reflected his belief in salvation through Christ.

Taking into account Edwards’ many resolutions to improve his life, actions, and words to better himself as a Christian, it is also not surprising that Esther would feel reassured by her father. Resolution one states: “Resolved to do whatever I think to be my duty and most for the good and advantage of mankind in general.” He writes in eight:

Resolved, to act, in all respects, both speaking and doing, as if nobody had been so vile as I, and as if I had committed the same sins, or had the same infirmities or failings as others; and that I will let the knowledge of their failings promote nothing but shame in myself, and prove only an occasion of my confessing my own sins and misery to God.²²

Here, we see a man acutely aware of his own humanity, not taking his own failures lightly in relation to others, and surely not excluding members of his own family. Esther’s account of her father’s mercy reflects an understanding that points to his keeping this resolution.

One also gets the sense of Edwards’ love of his children in a letter addressed to his son Jonathan, dated May 27, 1755. Jonathan Jr. had at that time been sent off by

²² “The Resolutions of Jonathan Edwards.”

his father to train for mission work with the Iroquois in a place called Onohoquaga.

Dear Child:

Though you are a great way off from us, yet you are not out of our minds: I am full of concern for you, often think of you, and often pray for you. Though you are at so great a distance from us, & from all your Relations, yet this is a Comfort to us, that the same God that is here, is also at Onohoquaha; and that though you are out of our light & out of our reach, you are always in God's hands, who is infinitely gracious; and we can go to Him, and commit you to his Care and Mercy. Take heed that you don't forget or neglect Him. Always set God before your Eyes, and live in his Fear, and seek Him every Day with all Diligence: for He, and He only can make you happy or miserable, as He pleases; and your Life and Health, and the eternal salvation of your soul and your all in this life and that which is to come depends on his will & Pleasure.²³

Jonathan Edwards, Sr., goes on to say that his brother David had passed away, and that to make sure that he trusts in Christ for salvation because one never knows when one's last day will be. Again, this correlates with the foundation upon which Edwards based his life, knowing and spreading of the Gospel. It was important for children to know this truth and learn to share it with others, which was the reason why he sent Jonathan Jr. to the Iroquois. The elder

²³ Robert L. Ferm, *A Colonial Pastor: Jonathan Edwards the Younger: 1745-1801* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976), 16.

Edwards, in this letter, is passionate in his love for his son. "I am full of concern for you, often think of you, and often pray for you" are words of compassion, mercy and love, akin to the same kind of love he must have experienced with his own God the Father in his *Personal Narrative*.

In making the connection between Edwards' own conversion experience and his vision of the "wonderful, great, full, pure and sweet grace and love" of God, we can see that there is little doubt that Edwards was able to draw upon this same "grace and love" to give to his children as well. Without his conversion experience Edwards would not have been as readily merciful towards his daughter, Esther, nor as caring towards his son Jonathan. As God the Father sacrificed his son Jesus on the cross for the sins of humanity, in the same way Edwards would even sacrifice time spent in relationship with his son for the Iroquois. As Robert Ferm writes:

Edwards, Sr. must not have regarded the rigorous weather or isolation of Stockbridge sufficient testing for a future "worker of the Lord," for in 1755 he sent his son to live in an Iroquois settlement, Onohoquaga, some 200 miles southwest of Albany.²⁴

This example of a "tender and affectionate father," as the elder Edwards signed himself, sounds very unlike the kind of parent who would be so severe as to punish his children harshly. Another of Edwards' resolutions stated:

Resolved, never to allow the least measure of any fretting uneasiness at my father or mother. Resolved to suffer no effects of it, so much as in

²⁴ Ferm, *Jonathan the Younger*, 15.

the least alteration of speech, or motion of my eye: and to be especially careful of it, with respect to any of our family.

If the elder Edwards was in any way considered unusually strict in his temper or admonishments of his children, one can assume that, from the nature of his journals, resolutions, and personal narrative that it was from a Christian heart that meant the best for his children and wished for their personal welfare and was ultimately concerned that they realize the importance of the Gospel message.

This is not to say that Edwards was not strict with his children; rather, it could be said that the measure to which Edwards was a faithful follower of Christ, and to be so wholeheartedly devoted to Him was the same measure which accompanied the love and discipline he must have had for his children. Rather than take an extreme position as Greven does by seeing evangelicals as inordinately strict, it is important to see their child rearing in light of the things they desired most in their spiritual lives.

In the life of Edwards, we can see that his grandfather, if not in his early years, was influential in his later years. As a matter of fact, Edwards was Stoddard's successor in the church pulpit at Northhampton, Massachusetts, and was the pastor there from 1726 to 1750. In taking up this calling, it is also of little surprise that, for a preacher of Edwards' stature, he would be very strict with himself. One of his resolutions was that he "maintain the strictest temperance in eating and drinking."²⁵ And of course, it is evident that with regards to children Edwards had both "correct" theology and compassion. Children were in need of

God's grace no less than adults, and they too needed discipline, according to Edwards.

In conclusion, parents with the Protestant temperaments that Greven discusses, including the Moderate and the Genteel, would not have been as fervently strict toward their children, nor would their own lives reflect as much self-discipline as the evangelicals. On the other hand, however, Greven may have glossed over Edwards' spiritual life and therefore not seen the sincerity and love behind his relationships with his family. Perhaps there are other parental examples where Greven is in need of different perspectives. For Edwards, it can be said that the essence of his life should be taken as no less than a man driven to exemplify his relationship with God in his relationships with his family.

That is not to say that Edwards was perfect; in fact, he is recorded to have been somewhat difficult to get along with at times and experienced a number of problems in his ministry at Northhampton. He eventually ended up doing mission work in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and later died on March 22, 1758, as the result of a smallpox inoculation after being elected president of the College of New Jersey (Princeton). Edwards, like the rest of us, experienced difficulty and hardships. As it stands, however, his writings point to a person who knew of his own frailty as a human being but was determined to be a better Christian in every way. His *Resolutions* are especially striking in that, regardless of the circumstance, he was determined to follow Christ and his example. As a source of love to his family members through discipline and honesty, as well as concern and sacrifice, he strove to live, ultimately, for the sake of the Gospel. These things, in addition to his evangelical child rearing practices, should be taken into

²⁵ "The Resolutions of Jonathan Edwards."

account when we examine Jonathan Edwards' life and his family.

ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN PROTESTANTS AND THE DEFENSE OF SLAVERY

Daniel Lavorgna

The following essay examines the way southern Protestants responded to the controversy over slavery in the years immediately prior to the American Civil War. Given the enormous influence that religion exercised over the cultural and political life of antebellum America, the efforts of southern churches to defend the institution of slavery represent a significant chapter from the pre-war period. In this essay, I explore the southern Protestant defense of slavery against the backdrop of several factors, particularly the evangelical revivals, the abolitionist impulse, the denominational controversies, and the slavery reforms. I confine my discussion to the period roughly between 1831 and 1861. In light of the general nature of this topic, this essay is more of a *suggestive* endeavor than a *demonstrative* one. My thesis is that, although southern Protestants won the exegetical battle over slavery on religious grounds, their arguments increasingly lacked any degree of authority in the face of the deplorable conditions of southern slavery and ultimately proved incapable of defending an institution that was already in decline.

Although southerners were the same heirs to the Revolution as their northern compatriots, sectional differences were noticeable within two decades of American Independence. In spite of sharing a common language, religion and heritage, both sections were gradually divided as a result

of economic differences. As the north increasingly turned towards free-market industrialization, the south increasingly turned towards plantation agriculture. Following Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin in 1783, southern cotton production soared dramatically. By 1790, a thousand tons of cotton were produced in the south annually with an ever-increasing demand. Yet as these economic developments intensified, so did regional differences. With each passing decade, northerners and southerners emerged as separate peoples dependent upon significantly different forms of labor production: free labor versus chattel slavery.

In addition to these key economic developments, a great revivalistic impulse burgeoned. The movement known as the Second Great Awakening spread throughout the American frontier. Between 1790 and 1830, countless camp meetings and urban revivals swept across the newly formed American Republic. Alongside an emphasis upon personal conversion, they combined intense evangelical fervor with radical moral and social reforms. It was the beginning of a new era on the American religious landscape. As one historian remarked, "Evangelical Protestantism forged an impressive symbiosis with the ideals of democracy and freedom, seeing in the new nation a destiny-determining opportunity to shape an authentically Christian republic."¹

Driven by strong millennial beliefs, the new revivalists envisioned a Christian nation purged of all moral and social evils. Believing that society should be liberated from all coercive and authoritarian structures, the revivalists launched numerous reform campaigns in an effort to bring about these changes. In the span of

¹ C. C. Goen, *Broken Churches, Broken Nation: Denominational Schisms and the Coming of the American Civil War* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1985), 27.

less than thirty years, America witnessed the founding of the American Board for Foreign Missions (1810), the American Bible Society (1816), the Colonization Society for Liberated Slaves (1817), the American Sunday School Union (1824), the American Tract Society (1825), the American Education Society (1826), the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance (1826), the American Home Missionary Society (1826), and many other organizations.²

As revivalism spread and its reforms gained momentum, one particular reform took center stage: abolition. This issue naturally placed intense scrutiny upon the slaveholding south. “Nothing in America was safe from the reformer’s burning gaze during the first half of the nineteenth century.”³ And certainly the institution of slavery was no exception. Largely because of innovations in mass printing, abolitionists increasingly devoted their efforts to publishing and disseminating vast amounts of anti-slavery literature. It must be remembered that there were practically no publishing restrictions at this time. “Almost anyone could set up a printing shop, and publishing was ephemeral, genuinely popular, and virtually uncontrolled.”⁴ Not surprisingly, the unrestricted circulation of anti-slavery literature infuriated countless southerners, especially slaveholders. But the literature’s inflammatory content was not the only point of contention; southerners were also insulted by the apparent unwillingness of northerners to restrain it.

² Mark Noll, *A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1992), 169.

³ Sydney Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), 637.

⁴ Hatch, *Democratization of American Christianity*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 144.

Thus, in response, southerners enacted mail restrictions in order to counteract the spread of the incendiary literature.

By 1830, the institution of slavery could no longer be taken for granted in America.⁵ The issue had come to define the building frustration and tension between the two sections. Largely due to growing abolitionist sentiment, the subject of slavery entered mainstream Protestantism and quickly became the focus of contentious religious debate. Within a relatively short period, the three largest Protestant denominations – Baptists, Methodists and Presbyterians – found themselves embroiled in the controversy. As northern abolitionists and clergy preached against slavery, southerners retaliated with biblical responses and counter-arguments that justified the institution. One abolitionist, Gerrit Smith, called the southern clergy “the most guilty and corrupting body of men in the land...[T]hey are unworthy and dangerous spiritual guides.”⁶ By 1844, all three denominations divided internally over the controversy.

Presbyterians found the issue too divisive to handle above their regional judicatories; Baptists had no authoritative denominational organizations to exercise control over the local churches; and Methodists quickly relaxed their early rules against slavery in response to Southern objections.⁷

The churches’ silence and ambivalence on the subject of slavery had finally drawn to a close.

⁵ Jack P. Maddex, Jr., “‘The Southern Apostasy’ Revisited: The Significance of Proslavery Christianity,” *Marxist Perspectives* 7 (1979), 132-41.

⁶ Goen, *Broken Churches, Broken Nation*, 143.

⁷ Goen, *Broken Churches*, 146.

In the context of the denominational schisms southern clergy devoted their efforts to defending the institution of slavery with increasingly sophisticated arguments. In earlier periods all of the early Western colonial powers—England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands—had justified the Atlantic slave trade and slavery upon the evangelical mandate—the idea that slaves would be converted to Christianity.⁸ Although there is reason to believe in the sincere desire of some early explorers to convert slaves, it is also true others used conversion as a pretense for European expansion and colonization. At any rate, the evangelical mandate was the first pro-slavery argument, grounded upon the notion that the heathen needed the evangelization of Christianity.

The argument developed by southern clergy was considerably more nuanced and was based upon a much more explicit appeal to the words of Scripture. To be sure, the south was armed with several formidable theologians—George Howe, Robert L. Dabney, James H. Thornwell, Thornton Stringfellow, Benjamin Palmer—all of whom were capable of scholarly exegesis. Rather than appeal to the Christian mandate to evangelize the world like their European ancestors, they appealed directly to the literal teaching of Holy Writ. Citing such proof-texts as Genesis 14:14, Leviticus 25:44, or 1 Corinthians 7:21, they argued that the Bible itself—and not economics—sanctioned the institution of slavery. Indeed, the Bible was replete with examples where slavery was approved. For example, Abraham and other Patriarchs kept slaves and neither Jesus nor the apostles ever condemned a single slaveholder.⁹

⁸ Albert J. Raboteau, *Slave Religion: The “Invisible Institution” in the Antebellum South* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 96.

⁹ For the following quotations, see Thornton Stringfellow, “The Bible Argument: or, Slavery in

The texts were plain enough: Abraham and the patriarchs held slaves, obviously with God’s approval; Jesus lived in a world where slavery was rampant and never condemned it; Paul wrote explicit instructions for the duties of masters and slaves, and he even sent a fugitive back to his master.¹⁰

Even historical criticism, southern ministers argued, supported their argument.

The political imperative of proslavery...[was] emboldened by the findings of biblical criticism that the New Testament writers did not condemn slavery (as abolitionists would wish) but instead expressed views similar to those in the wider Greco-Roman slave culture...Most embarrassing for today’s readers of the Bible, the proslavery spokesmen were defending the more defensible position from the perspective of historical criticism.¹¹

In short, the best scholarship supported a form of slavery that was already present throughout southern society.

Southern clergy also maintained that slaveholding was fundamentally consistent with an authentic Christian model of social order. Along the lines of the Abrahamic household, hierarchical and paternalistic relations were considered appropriate and necessary for the proper ordering of

the Light of Divine Revelation,” in *Cotton is King, and Pro-slavery Arguments*, ed. E. N. Elliott (1860; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968), 459-521.

¹⁰ Goen, *Broken Churches*, 127.

¹¹ Goen, *Broken Churches*, 128.

society.¹² This meant that different social classes were designed to serve different roles and functions. Slavery, in other words, served one part of a “divinely-ordained, class-stratified social order.”¹³ Furthermore, the only alternatives to an organic slave society were either anarchy or despotism. Thus, when opponents challenged slavery, they were calling into question more than the institution of slavery; they were contending with an entire cultural and religious view of society. For southern Protestants, religious orthodoxy, traditional social values, and conservative republicanism were all of one piece.¹⁴

Ministers from the south were not in unanimous agreement on every fine point with regard to the morality of slavery. Indeed, it would be a mistake to assume that all of them thought slavery was “good” in every respect. Instead, it appears that most of them actually viewed slavery as a “necessary evil.”¹⁵ To be sure, slavery was considered a divinely ordained sphere of existence, but it was also an unfortunate consequence of sinful corruption. In a sermon delivered in 1850, James Henry Thornwell spoke for many southern clergy:

Slavery is part of the curse which sin has introduced into the world, and stands in the same general relations to Christianity as poverty, sickness,

disease or death...It is not absolutely a good...[but] a natural evil which God has visited upon society.¹⁶

Other ministers argued that slavery was in fact a social good. It not only represented a fact of life but it also promoted greater social harmony and structure. Often this argument was supported by an appeal to the comparable evils suffered by laboring classes in the north. Northern laborers, ministers argued, actually suffered more individual and family hardships than slaves laboring on southern plantations. Furthermore, slavery provided slaves with an opportunity for Christian teaching they would not otherwise receive.

In spite of such minor differences of interpretation, southern clergy nevertheless agreed fully on the divine authority of Scripture. It was an advantage they possessed throughout the debates with their northern critics and opponents. To affirm the divine authority of Scripture essentially meant an unwavering obligation to all of the precepts contained between the pages, including the institution of slavery. “If the Bible tolerated, or actually sanctioned, slavery, then it was incumbent upon believers to hear and obey. The logic was inescapable.”¹⁷ Ultimately, this line of reasoning gave southern clergy a perceived advantage in the religious debates. It allowed them to present their opponents with forced options: choose orthodoxy with slavery or heresy with emancipation.

It must be remembered that the vast majority of Americans revered the Bible in one sense or another. As Mark Noll remarks,

¹² Maddex, Jr., “‘The Southern Apostasy’ Revisited,” 135.

¹³ Eugene Genovese, “The Divine Sanction of Social Order: Religious Foundations of the Southern Slaveholders’ World View,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 55 (1987), 211-33.

¹⁴ Eugene Genovese, “Religion in the Collapse of the American Union,” in *Religion and the American Civil War*, eds., Randall Miller, Harry S. Stout, and Charles Wilson Reagan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 81.

¹⁵ See Bertram Wyatt-Brown, “Church, Honor, and Secession,” in *Religion and the American Civil War*, 91.

¹⁶ See Thornwell’s sermon, “The Rights and Duties of Masters,” in *God Ordained This War: Sermons on the Sectional Crisis, 1830-1865*, ed. David B. Chesebrough (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 187.

¹⁷ Mark Noll, “The Bible and Slavery,” in *Religion and the American Civil War*, 43.

“The overwhelming public attitude toward the Bible in the antebellum United States—even by those who in private neither read nor heeded it—was one of reverential, implicit deference.”¹⁸ So when northern clergy or abolitionists called into question biblical passages upon which the pro-slavery argument was made, most southerners (and indeed most Americans) not surprisingly interpreted this as a subversive attack upon the entire Christian faith. Some opponents of slavery were even denounced as infidels who rejected the Bible. As Thornwell retorted in 1850:

The parties in this conflict are not merely Abolitionists and Slaveholders; they are Atheists, Socialists, Communists, Red Republicans, Jacobins on the one side, and the friends of order and regulated freedom on the other. In one word, the world is the battle ground, Christianity and Atheism the combatants, and the progress of humanity the stake.¹⁹

Doubts regarding the Bible—or at least doubts about the literal interpretations of it—were unlikely to garner much support anywhere in America.

The theological justification aside, the majority of southern clergy were also painfully aware of the radical disjoint between their abstract arguments in favor of slavery and its actual concrete expression. They were aware of the deplorable abuses on so many southern plantations, an awareness that mobilized many of them to provide greater attention to the slave-master ideal. Indeed, many clergy spent considerable efforts exhorting slaveholders to obey their responsibilities as masters.

¹⁸ Noll, “Bible and Slavery,” 44.

¹⁹ Cited in Genovese, “Religion in the Collapse,” 80.

Slaveholding, they argued, was not an opportunity for abuse; it entailed a sacred responsibility that was under the eye of divine judgment.

Reform-minded southern clergy repeatedly appealed to the divine standard of slaveholding outlined in Scripture. The master-slave relationship was to be identified with explicit Biblical standards: a master-slave relation in accordance with the Decalogue, modeled upon the Abrahamic household, and consonant with the teachings of Jesus.²⁰ As a sacred duty, slaveholders were expected to follow the example of Abraham in their treatment of slaves. As paternalistic masters, slaveholders were under a sacred obligation to treat their slaves as members of a common household. As the Episcopalian Bishop Stephen Elliot would declare during the first year of the war, “We are fighting to protect and preserve a race who form part of our household, and stand with us next to our children.”²¹

Although slaveholders did attempt to implement some of the reforms, increasing attacks from abolitionists continued to frustrate already existing tensions between the two sections. In response, southerners often criticized abolitionists for hampering their efforts. Nevertheless, the deplorable conditions of slavery continued to belie the institution’s ideals: many slaves suffered callous treatment; many were not fed or clothed well; slave marriages were not recognized; slave families were separated; slaves did not receive adequate Christian instruction; slave testimony was inadmissible evidence; brutish slaveholders were not disciplined; and slave literacy was prohibited. Even clergy failed to treat their slaves appropriately. “Incidents of Christian

²⁰ Eugene D. Genovese, *A Consuming Fire: The Fall of the Confederacy in the Mind of the White Christian South* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1998), 5.

²¹ Cited in Genovese, *Consuming Fire*, 67.

slaveholders, including clergymen, brutalizing their slaves abound in the narratives of former slaves.”²²

Although southern clergy continued to preach against abuses, the general conditions on southern plantations experienced little improvement. In fact, the dismal results of the reforms led at least one southern Presbyterian minister, Finis Ewing, to free his slaves and subsequently to organize a new denomination called the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. “Ewing saw too many slaveholders who did not provide proper religious instruction or even clothe and feed their people properly.”²³ More than ever, southern ministers realized that the very existence of slavery depended upon slaveholders meeting their Christian responsibilities. With each passing year, however, the failure of the slavery reforms continued to tarnish southern slavery. “Deep antislavery sentiment seemed to be growing throughout Christendom year by year...[and] southern apologists, lay or clerical, had to face the fact that few listened to their self-justifications unless to refute them.”²⁴

On the eve of the Civil War, it was clear that the reforms did not ameliorate the lot of slaves.²⁵ Aside from occasionally disciplining vicious masters or ensuring minimal comfort for slaves, the reforms were, for the most part, a dismal failure. However, with the impending crisis of the Union on their hands, southern clergy were now faced with other challenges. Decades of sectional anger and frustration had finally brought the two sides to war. Thus, the clergy agreed to carry the reforms forward after the war.

In conclusion, the southern Protestant defense of slavery must be understood against the backdrop of several historical factors. When southern clergy first attempted to defend the institution of slavery, they were responding to the growing anti-slavery sentiment spreading across America. In the wake of the denominational schisms southern clergy constructed an elaborate defense of slavery based upon an explicit appeal to Scripture, and in doing so argued that slaveholding was thoroughly consistent with an authentic Christian social order. As seen, the major flaw in their argument was that the reality of slavery evident throughout the south hardly resembled the ideal of their arguments. Even though southern Protestants believed they won the slavery debates on strictly religious grounds, their arguments increasingly lost credibility.

²² Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 152.

²³ Genovese, *Consuming Fire*, 44.

²⁴ Wyatt-Brown, “Church, Honor, and Secession,” 92-3.

²⁵ Genovese, *Consuming Fire*, p. 32.

**PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: THE
EMPOWERED, ANTI-FEMINIST
CONSERVATIVE**

Marc Helgeson

The Equal Rights Amendment

1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.¹

On June 27, 1982 – three days prior to the official expiration date of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) – the *Chicago Tribune*'s "Perspective" section ran a three-page obituary for the ERA.² Just two days earlier, the bill had gone to the Illinois State House of Representatives and failed in a final attempt at ratification, falling just four votes shy of the three-fifths majority it would have needed to pass.³ In the special section of June 27, featured prominently is a picture of Phyllis Schlafly with one hand raised in triumph, and another holding what appears to be a bouquet of roses. Schlafly, a woman who wore many hats – lawyer, self-styled expert on strategic nuclear defense, daughter, wife, and most importantly, mother of six – was the one who received primary credit for its defeat.

¹ Donald G. Mathews and Jane Sherron DeHart, *Sex, Gender, and the Politics of ERA: A State and the Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), vii.

² *Chicago Tribune*, 27 June 1982, sec. 2, pg. 1.

³ *Chicago Tribune*, 25 June 1982, sec. 1, pg. 1.

To know the true Phyllis Schlafly, however, one has to look further back than her struggles in opposing the ERA. She was poised, articulate, intelligent, and educated. She was also a strong-willed public figure in the 1950s and 1960s, long before second wave feminism truly took root. In 1952 and 1970, Schlafly ran for a seat in the United States House of Representatives, both times unsuccessfully, as well as a bitter, albeit unsuccessful run for president of the National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW) in 1967.⁴ Schlafly, who has always been an expert organizer and orator, simply could not successfully win a bid for an elected office. This paper intends to approach Schlafly as a politician without a home – a woman who sought and garnered much political attention, yet without much substance to her cause until the emergence of the ERA. In many of the works concerning the ERA, Schlafly is seen as a detractor from the movement – an obvious and unflattering light in which to portray her. She received such negative attention primarily because she was one of the only voices expressing opposition to the ERA at a time when many thought its passage inevitable. Her actions are seen as contemptuous of women and equal rights, as well as detrimental. And, while this may all be true to a certain extent, one cannot forget the simple, yet enormous consequences of Schlafly's actions – she was almost solely responsible for blocking the ratification of a Constitutional amendment that would have assured equal rights for the sexes.⁵

⁴ Carol Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 151-62, 179-214.

⁵ For discussions on the Equal Rights Amendment and Second Wave Feminism, see Janet K. Boles, *The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process* (New York: Longman, 1979); Renee Feinberg, *The Equal Rights Amendment: An Annotated Bibliography of the Issues, 1976-1985*

In what is surely an ironic twist, Schlafly possessed all the virtues and skills that many in the feminist movement lauded – empowerment, intelligence, and the ability to motivate others to action – yet Schlafly used these skills to work against those seeking equal rights for women. Schlafly’s position in the emerging conservative movement called “The New Right” was critically important. She served as the catalyst for many conservative-minded women’s activists because she stressed the themes of motherhood, family, and morality in her socially conservative platform. Schlafly unabashedly expressed her views in her personal newsletter, *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, which she made readily available to her far-flung Stop Taking Our Rights ERA (STOP ERA) group, a de-centralized organization whose primary figure was Schlafly herself. The ERA, Schlafly believed, through seeking equal status between men and women, would delegate the responsibilities of motherhood and parenting equally between both men and women, to the detriment of women, whom

(New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Donald G. Mathews and Jane Sherron DeHart, *Sex, Gender, and the Politics of ERA* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Janet J. Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). For discussions on the emergence of the conservative movement, see Mary C. Brennan, *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Rebecca Klatch, *Women of the New Right* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). For discussions of Phyllis Schlafly, see Carol Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*; Peter N. Carroll, *Famous in America: The Passion to Succeed* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1985); and Bobby Joe Sims, “The American Right-Wing: A Case Study of the Political Role and Ideas of Phyllis Schlafly” (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1973).

Schlafly saw as uniquely superior because of their status as mothers.⁶ She stated in her book, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, “The fundamental error of the Equal Rights Amendment ... is that it will mandate the gender-free, rigid, absolute equality of treatment of men and women under every federal and state law.”⁷ That statement was the culmination of everything that Schlafly had been working against since her graduation from Washington University in St. Louis in 1945. For Schlafly, a conservative-minded woman, the very notion of government intervention into questions of gender and motherhood was unthinkable. Carol Felsenthal, in the primary Schlafly biography, claims that “Schlafly put aside her consuming interest in defense and nuclear strategy and took on the ERA” because of her “inbred fear and suspicion of this hulking bureaucracy.”⁸

Schlafly was, quite simply, a woman poised for political success. It was the emergence of the ERA as a controversial issue that finally gave her the national platform she so badly sought. Yet the emergence of the New Right and the re-birth of conservatism motivated many women to take action against the ERA, which helped Schlafly win support for her cause. It is this paper’s intention to show that Schlafly was ultimately successful in her attempts to derail the ERA because she was able to employ all of the skills and strengths she had acquired up until this point – her conservative and semi-impoverished upbringing; her strict and exacting education; her conservative political ideologies; and her ever-growing followers who devoted themselves wholly to her

⁶ “What the Equal Rights Amendment Means,” *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, Jan. 1973, 3.

⁷ Phyllis Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1977), 68.

⁸ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 67-74.

causes – to wage a national campaign against a proposed constitutional amendment that she found utterly useless and offensive.

Background

She never went through that silly, giddy stage as a teenager ... She was never silly. She was always sort of seventeen going on thirty-five.⁹

Phyllis Schlafly was born on August 15, 1924, in St. Louis, Missouri to Odile “Dadie” Dodge and Bruce Stewart.¹⁰ Like many others of the same generation, Schlafly’s family suffered through the Great Depression. As a result of layoffs at Westinghouse in St. Louis, Bruce Stewart, a heavy-equipment sales engineer, lost his job. Thus Dadie was the primary wage-earner through Phyllis’ formative years, sparking in Phyllis more than a few traits that were easily recognizable later in life. For one, Phyllis’ opposition to those who saw women in the workplace as “empowered” largely stemmed from the position her mother was put in during this time. Dadie, Phyllis claims, did not necessarily want to work, yet did so out of necessity to put food on the table for her daughters.¹¹ Bruce, on the other hand, worked low-paying jobs when possible while at same time he worked on invention after failed invention. Phyllis seems to have taken much of her conservative background from her father, a proud man who, despite being unemployed throughout the Great Depression, still could not find it in himself to vote for Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal programs.

Bruce was an avid conservative who was thoroughly against big government, and thus believed that the New Deal was yet more intrusion of the government into the private sector.¹² Phyllis, as evidenced through many of her arguments against the ERA – specifically Section II – carried on her father’s legacy.

One of the most significant and surprising pieces of information about Schlafly’s background is that she does not come from money or power. Her family, though it had a few connections, was not particularly influential in St. Louis. Phyllis learned early on to live frugally, and that the ability to succeed meant to be prepared. Peter N. Carroll, in a biographical sketch of Schlafly in his book *Famous in America: The Passion to Succeed*, says, “She treated her young life as a job, placing emphasis on such values as obedience, self-discipline, and punctuality.”¹³ These traits would serve her well through her long years in the public eye.

Her education at City House Catholic School in St. Louis also prepared Phyllis in other ways. The school, run by nuns, taught classical courses such as Latin and French and placed “equal emphasis on literature and discipline, on mathematics and manners.”¹⁴ It was here that Phyllis became the figure that many saw on televised debates and in newspaper photographs throughout the 1970s and 1980s: poised, elegant, always smiling, always brimming with self-satisfaction. She was able to effectively use her training from City House and carry it over into her work against the ERA by projecting the image of a wholly satisfied mother, wife, daughter, as well as empowered woman. Schlafly went out of

⁹ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 36.

¹⁰ Carroll, *Famous in America*, 49-50.

¹¹ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 11-13.

¹² Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 18.

¹³ Carroll, *Famous in America*, 51.

¹⁴ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 34.

her way to embody all of the virtues that she and her STOP-ERA supporters held in the highest esteem: happy wives and mothers, ready to clean house and put the needs of the family above all else, protected within their “superior” role as mother, and provided for by their husbands, who also have very specific domestic roles to enact.¹⁵

Yet Schlafly put a new twist on this image by embodying all the virtues that the feminist movement held dear, too. An anonymous ERA supporter was quoted in the *Chicago Tribune* on June 27, 1982, as saying, “She [Schlafly] is so self-confident; she is a very liberated woman ... She has everything they [ERA supporters] are fighting for. She’s independent, intelligent, well-educated and articulate.”¹⁶ Schlafly supported herself through her undergraduate studies at Washington University in St. Louis by working as an ammunitions tester at a munitions plant. She spent the majority of her days either in class or at the munitions plant, catching sleep in short intervals between studying and traveling to and from either school or work. Her tireless work ethic was second to none. It served her well in her next venture as a master’s student at Radcliffe, where she graduated merely eight months after arriving. She had earned a master’s in political science from Harvard before her twenty-first birthday.¹⁷

Opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment

This healthy, normal baby has a handicap. She was born female.¹⁸

¹⁵ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 33.

¹⁶ “A symbol, a voice,” *Chicago Tribune*, 27 June 1982, sec. 2, pg. 2.

¹⁷ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 62-65.

¹⁸ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 11.

Schlafly quoted the above statement in 1977 to make a point about the feminist movement – women, as Schlafly believed, saw themselves as handicapped by their gender. To someone like Schlafly, who overcame obstacle after obstacle in her life regardless of her sex, the above argument seemed preposterous. “The women’s liberationist,” Schlafly believed, “... is imprisoned by her own negative view of herself and of her place in the world around her.”¹⁹ In her book, *Feminist Fantasies*, she elaborated on the inherent differences between the words “feminist” and “feminine,” stating:

Feminism has nothing at all to do with being “feminine.” The feminine woman enjoys her right to be a woman. She has a positive outlook on life. She knows that she is a person with her own identity and that she can seek fulfillment in the career of her choice, including that of traditional wife and mother.²⁰

On the opposite side of this spectrum, Schlafly believed that feminists “are the most sexist women in the world, who cannot solve their own problems and want the government to do it for them.”²¹

To understand the multi-faceted objection Schlafly had to the ERA, we need to first understand that she came from an ultra-conservative background. Bobby Joe Sims, in a dissertation on the political ideology behind Schlafly, describes Schlafly as a “traditional conservative” who tended to view things as either good or bad. For Schlafly, Sims argues, the tendency to speak in terms of moral righteousness as well as to

¹⁹ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 11.

²⁰ Phyllis Schlafly, *Feminist Fantasies* (Dallas: Spence Publishing, 2003), 4-5.

²¹ “A Kitchen Crusader,” *Newsweek*, 25 July 1977, 35.

separate issues into one of two categories – either “good” or “bad” – was extremely useful. “She expresses a confidence in simple, one-dimensional solutions,” he says, “and is able to boil complex, multi-faceted issues (such as the ERA) down to small, easily definable solutions.”²² When Schlafly was originally approached about opposing the ERA, her initial reaction was that she did not have time for it. Yet immediately after being pressed by a friend to debate the issue and after taking a few moments to read and consider the proposed Constitutional Amendment, Schlafly (who even has stated that before she’d seriously read it, she might have considered supporting it) classified it as “bad.”²³

Rebecca Klatch, in a study of female conservatives during the emergence of the “New Right,” discusses two opposing types of conservatism: the social conservatives and the laissez-faire conservatives. In her view, Schlafly is a primary example of a social conservative, one who bases her conservative viewpoints almost completely on a moral framework. Klatch cites a *Phyllis Schlafly Report* article concerning the Declaration of Independence as evidence of Schlafly’s moral and political leanings. In the article, Schlafly claimed that the Declaration of Independence was “God-given,” and that those who signed it were “God-inspired.”²⁴ Klatch and Sims both agree, albeit for different reasons, that Schlafly was indeed emotionally and mentally attached to the battles she has waged throughout her political career. For Sims, who tries unsuccessfully to place Schlafly within the context of the “radical right,” she represented a conservative who based her decisions on not just moral

dilemmas, but on life-style choices.²⁵ Klatch, on the other hand, discusses Schlafly as a member of the moral majority – those who base their conservatism off the need to be ethical, moral, and above all else, useful as a member of a God-fearing public.²⁶

Schlafly’s reasons for opposing the ERA are far-reaching and too numerous to list in their entirety within this paper. Primarily, she focused not on how the ERA would accentuate privileges that women had held up until that point, but on how the ERA would lessen women’s status as “superior” figures within a moral society.²⁷ In “What the Equal Rights Amendment Means” from the *Phyllis Schlafly Report*, she lists a few of her arguments: that every wife will be responsible for 50% of financial support in the family; that the ERA will forever take away a woman’s option between motherhood or full-time employment; that the ERA will create unisex physical education programs; and, in one of her most controversial ideas about the ERA, that women will not only be subject to the military draft, but will also be forced to serve in combat duty.²⁸ The arguments were simple yet effective—simple enough to be understood by the thousands of moral conservatives and terrifying enough to motivate Schlafly’s supporters into action.

The argument that caused the most adamant uprising was the issue of women in the military. For Schlafly, a former munitions expert as well as an expert on strategic nuclear defense, the cause fit perfectly into her political leanings, melding both her background in military affairs with her conservative morality. While arguing against drafting women into the military, Schlafly deftly coated her claims that

²² Sims, “The American Right-Wing,” 116-19.

²³ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 240-41.

²⁴ Klatch, *Women of the New Right*, 20-23.

²⁵ Sims, *The American Right Wing*, 164-82.

²⁶ Klatch, *Women of the New Right*, 22-31.

²⁷ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 33.

²⁸ “What the Equal Rights Amendment Means,” *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, January 1973, 3.

women were physically inferior to men by bringing up the problem of motherhood in the military. She addressed the fact that women in the military under the ERA would be viewed as the equals of men, even during and after pregnancy. According to Schlafly this would impact the costs of training a soldier when compared to lost time due to pregnancy. Moreover, Schlafly was concerned over the issue of who should raise the children after the mothers were sent to war. She summed up her arguments asserting, "The military has acquiesced in the feminist fallacy that having a baby is no more incapacitating than breaking a leg."²⁹ Her supporters, quite obviously, would agree.

Motherhood, in the eyes of Phyllis Schlafly and STOP ERA, was the highest pinnacle a woman could reach, beyond success in the business world, in financial achievement, or even beyond glory and fame. "Do you want the satisfaction of achievement in your career?" Schlafly asked. "No career in the world offers this reward at such an early age as motherhood."³⁰ By tying in the themes of militarism and motherhood, Schlafly was able to strike a chord that resonated with mothers all across the nation who felt disenchanted with the liberalism of the mid-to late-1960s and early-1970s. Furthermore, there was another message available in Schlafly's writings: men were never mentioned as proper caretakers for children. In hindsight, it makes sense for Schlafly to not address this issue.

As highlighted above, she tied her concerns for both motherhood and the possibility of drafting women into the military together by addressing them

together. Yet she never once mentioned the fact that men could be capable parental figures, too. To Schlafly, who frequently argued that, if the ERA were to pass, women would be going from "superior" status to "equal" status, the notion that women would be forced to share the duties of raising children was preposterous.³¹ She summed up her own view on the topic: "Men and women have different natures, different purposes, and different functions. Civilization depends on understanding and respecting those differences."³²

Anti-Feminist Supporters

She suddenly discovers the whole previously unknown universe of political activity.³³

William Rusher, a noted member and historian of the conservative movement from the 1950s to the present, discusses the emergence of a large female presence in the conservative movement during the late 1950s/early 1960s. He claims that many conservative women had "become convinced that the nation's liberals were leading America on a course of political, economic, and moral decline."³⁴ This perfectly complements similar statements made by Rebecca Klatch, who argues that the feminist movement not only motivated many like-minded female enthusiasts to become politically active, but motivated more conservative women than ever before to become active in the political arena. She states:

³¹ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 33.

³² Schlafly, *Feminist Fantasies*, 211.

³³ William Rusher, "Toward a History of the Conservative Movement," *Journal of Policy History* 14:3 (2002), 325.

³⁴ Rusher, "Toward a History of the Conservative Movement," 325.

²⁹ Phyllis Schlafly, "Women in Military Combat? What it Means for America Culture and Defense," *Heritage Lectures* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1991), 2.

³⁰ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 47.

During the same time in which thousands of women mobilized to place feminist issues on the political agenda and to secure women's place within the public realm groups of women on the right joined together to promote a return to traditional ways, endorsing women's role within the family.³⁵

Hence, the national stage was set for a showdown between two groups sharing similar concerns, women's liberationists and women's rights activists versus Phyllis Schlafly and her adamant supporters in STOP-ERA.

By the time that Phyllis Schlafly began thumping the national political scene in opposition to the ERA, she had already garnered a staunch and formidable political following. Her first bid for Congress in 1952 failed, but it won over many other women who saw in Schlafly what an ideal woman could be: educated and independent, yet at the same time maternal and dedicated to the needs of her family. As if in response to this perceived image, Schlafly posed for a *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* photographer the day after she won the primary for the election. The famous picture showing Schlafly in an apron as she cooks eggs ran with a caption that said, "Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly cooks her husband's breakfast Wednesday morning after winning the nomination ... She doesn't let political successes interfere with her wifely duties."³⁶ As a consequence, women who found Schlafly appealing began to flock to the causes she espoused.

In 1964, after a heated run-up to win the nomination for Republican Party, Barry Goldwater stood victorious, in large part due to the efforts of Schlafly and her multi-

million seller *A Choice Not An Echo*. The book, which sold over three million copies, did so without placement of a single ad. Indeed, word-of-mouth was the only reason that the book sold so well. And Schlafly, who chose to write about Goldwater because he had what she called "strong moral and patriotic principles," was the impetus for the entire campaign.³⁷ Just as her bid for Congress in 1952 garnered her national attention for its curiosity factor – a woman running for Congress – *A Choice Not An Echo* forced many in the Republican party to rethink their views on what government should be, and many, including a large female majority, found themselves siding with Schlafly's viewpoints.

Indeed, Schlafly's constant references to morality and social responsibility throughout her political career is indicative of the social conservative model that Klatch has delineated. She claims that many women who were motivated to become conservative activists did so because of their moral misgivings about the direction the country was heading in. All around them, ever since the 1950s, they saw a shift towards moral decay and social upheaval and sought to combat it in any way that they could.³⁸ One particular solution seemed to rest with Phyllis Schlafly, who, as has been illustrated, acted as a moral barometer for conservative women by addressing their concerns publicly.

One of Schlafly's favorite points of contention for passage of the ERA, women in the military, illustrates how Schlafly motivated these women through tapping in to their deeply held moral beliefs as well as their fears about the decline of the country. In the March 1973 issue of *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, she spent ample time on the

³⁵ Klatch, *Women of the New Right*, 4.

³⁶ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 154-55.

³⁷ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 163-70.

³⁸ Klatch, *Women of the New Right*, 25-31.

subject. On the opening page she couched the ERA in military terms, arguing, “ERA is a proposed constitutional amendment which will positively, absolutely, and without the slightest shadow of a doubt, make women subject to the military draft on the same basis with men.”³⁹ Of the women who followed Schlafly during the fight for the ERA, not one of them would read the above statement and believe that it meant something positive for women in America.

As Sims argues in his discussion of Schlafly’s need for classifying moral dilemmas, this one most definitely pointed toward “bad” and it did so because of the way Schlafly addressed the topic. Morally, Schlafly closed the door on the issue. She believed that the ERA was a piece of legislature that pushed for a “gender-neutral society.”⁴⁰ She also believed that women were physically inferior to men.⁴¹ As a result, Schlafly felt that there was no reason for women to serve in the military, which was morally and intellectually on the opposite side of the fence of the feminist viewpoint. She was able to scare many conservative women into action against the ERA by claiming that it would make the moral, conservative and Christian woman’s daughters, in addition to their sons, subject to the military draft in the wake of the Vietnam War. Klatch sustains this notion of motivation for action, stating, “Moral conviction is the source of these women’s activism ... In their vision of America, past and present, social conservatives are taking a firm stand to ensure that their hopes for the country, and not their fears, are realized in the coming years.”⁴²

³⁹ “Should Women Be Drafted?,” *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, March 1973, 1.

⁴⁰ Schlafly, “Women in Military Combat? What it Means for American Culture and Defense,” 6.

⁴¹ Schlafly, *Feminist Fantasies*, 162.

⁴² Klatch, *Women of the New Right*, 30.

Activism Against the ERA

The average State Legislator is a conscientious, hard-working family man or woman who wants to do the best thing for his or her constituents and is favorably inclined toward any legislation to benefit women.⁴³

Phyllis Schlafly knew exactly what she was saying in the above statement, and it is inextricably tied in with the way she and her supporters in STOP-ERA tirelessly campaigned against the ERA. The above statement was addressed to a “State Legislator,” as these individuals were the only ones who still had the power to reject the ERA and stop it from being amended to the Constitution. STOP-ERA centered nearly all of their political efforts on the state governments in their bids to either rescind or block passage of the ERA. She addressed the state legislators positively by complimenting them and by making an emotional appeal to their sense of duty to “do the best thing ... to benefit women.”⁴⁴

Public perception of a political cause is one of the primary ways in which that cause can either fail or succeed, and it is the intention of this section to show that Schlafly was able to win the war of the ERA by manipulating language in such a way that her side seemed less dangerous to the public at large. Schlafly was able to accomplish this feat through two primary weapons. First, her large and de-centralized STOP-ERA organization, which depended almost completely on Schlafly’s leadership and guidance throughout the campaign against the ERA, provided her with large numbers of activist women who shared her conservative views. Second, through deftly

⁴³ “Dear State Legislator: The Buck Stops With You!” *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, February 1973, 1.

⁴⁴ “Dear State Legislator: The Buck Stops With You!” *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, February 1973, 1.

manipulating the language of her activism, Schlafly was able to degrade her opposition as well as appeal to the fears of her supporters. Through demonstrating how she was able to use these two very large, very powerful weapons, it will become clear how Schlafly was able to win the war over the ERA.

The ERA supporters were handicapped, sometimes even by their own admission, as to how they were able to campaign against Schlafly and STOP-ERA. For the supporters of the ERA, who consisted primarily of a community of women stressing equality, it made very little sense to appoint a hierarchical chain of command to make decisions about the activism and to issue proclamations. Janet J. Mansbridge, in *Why We Lost the ERA*, does not dance lightly around the topic, stressing that Schlafly and STOP-ERA won widespread support in the state legislatures because they were essentially all on the same page. Schlafly's role as the head of a de-centralized organization with a hierarchical command chain proved the key to their success.⁴⁵ In discussing how the feminist movement pushed for equality in activism above order-following, an anonymous National Organization of Women leader stressed how the ERA ended up becoming "a short-term gain for a long-term loss."⁴⁶ Alternately, Mansbridge addresses Schlafly and STOP-ERA by arguing:

STOP-ERA was able to overcome some of the problems of participatory decentralization by accepting, at least in theory, a relatively hierarchical chain of command centering on one person – Phyllis Schlafly – without whom the

opposition would probably not have been able to prevent ratification.⁴⁷

The idea for STOP-ERA was simple and straightforward: rely on Schlafly to run the campaign, which she did, and ride her intellect and political savvy to victory. Schlafly's biographer, Carol Felsenthal, addresses the inner-workings of STOP-ERA by claiming that "Schlafly created no mechanism for transfer of power, no board of directors, no annual meetings where new officers [were] elected."⁴⁸ We can speculate about Schlafly's motivations for creating an organization with such a vulnerable power base – one woman – but we cannot deny the fact that STOP-ERA was successful due in large part to the fact that Schlafly took complete control of the group. STOP-ERA simply would not have existed without Phyllis Schlafly.

More importantly, though, is the way in which Schlafly was able to use her STOP-ERA supporters to help her spread the word against the ERA. Aside from activism in the state legislatures, one of the major weapons in the STOP-ERA arsenal was the power of the English language to either affirm or degrade their targets. Furthermore, she was able to use the language of the feminist movement against itself by failing to delineate between the two major feminist groups, women's rights activists and women's liberationists. Women's rights activists were typically the older generation of women who were working through political and social organizational channels like NOW and *Ms.* magazine. They represented the more conservative side of the feminist spectrum, ideologically opposite from women's liberationists who rejected men and typical social mores to

⁴⁵ Janet J. Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, 133.

⁴⁶ Janet J. Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, 134.

⁴⁷ Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, 133.

⁴⁸ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 263.

become “liberated” from a male-dominated society. While it is true that both fought for the ratification of the ERA, the groups were quite dissimilar.

Again, it was through the blurring of the distinction between these two equally important feminist groups that Schlafly was able to win more support and garner more attention for her own cause of stopping the ERA at all costs. Rarely did Schlafly ever use the phrase “women’s rights activist” when addressing those in the feminist movement. Instead, she used the “women’s liberationist” phrase, conjuring up images of women who have no desire to participate in a male-dominated society; women so far out of the realm of what was considered “normal” social values that they were deemed dangerous to the moral base of society by many conservative women. Schlafly addressed her concerns with “women’s liberationists” in *The Power of the Positive Woman*, arguing, “If man is targeted as the enemy, and the ultimate goal of women’s liberation is independence from men and the avoidance of pregnancy and its consequences, then lesbianism is logically the highest form in the ritual of women’s liberation.”⁴⁹ She was not being facetious about who she believed her true enemies were – women’s liberationists and lesbians. Schlafly was not coy about how she believed “women’s libbers” were affecting society: they were against men, against marriage, and most importantly, against motherhood. There was no implied distinction between women’s rights activists and women’s liberationists. To Schlafly, and hence to the entire anti-feminist support organization that she cultivated, the fight was not against those women who shared some of the same values (women’s rights activists) but instead against those who shared none of the same values as the

⁴⁹ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 12.

STOP-ERA workers (women’s liberationists and lesbians).

To further understand the way in which Schlafly used language, we must look at Barbara Solomon’s examination of STOP-ERA’s language in the fight against the ERA. Specifically, Solomon analyzes the way in which Schlafly used positive speech to motivate her STOP-ERA supporters by constantly reaffirming their beliefs that they were the heterosexual, maternal life-givers to the family. Solomon notes how Schlafly portrayed mothers as “the central figure in the emotional life of the family” and “as the source of warmth and humanness in striking contrast to the destructive and self-centered feminist.”⁵⁰ Again the distinction between different types of feminists was absent, as all feminists were categorized under the term “feminist” with no regard paid to their differences in either belief systems or activism. A supporter of the ERA, Solomon claims in another article, was “pictured not as a person who seeks to open up new possibilities for her sex but as a warped, negative misanthropist bent on spoiling for others what she herself cannot enjoy.”⁵¹

Yet there was a sense of equality inherent in the language of Phyllis Schlafly when she discussed those who sided with her cause. All women were not only superior to men because of their positions as mothers, but they were also equal with one another, too, again because of their position as mothers. She stated:

The Positive Woman ... rejoices in the creative capability within her body and the power potential of her

⁵⁰ Barbara Solomon, “The ‘Positive Woman’s’ Journey: A Mythic Analysis of the Rhetoric of STOP-ERA,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 65:3 (1979), 266.

⁵¹ Barbara Solomon, “The Rhetoric of STOP-ERA: Fatalistic Reaffirmation,” *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 44:1 (Fall 1978), 47.

mind and spirit. She understands that men and women are different, and that those very differences provide the key to her success as a person and fulfillment as a woman.⁵²

Inherent was the theme of motherhood and the theme of superiority over men; women were the mothers of humanity, and hence served a more important function in life than men do. Just as Schlafly used motherhood as an argument against women in the military and ultimately against the ERA as a whole, she used it as a rallying point for her supporters. She essentially said that all women were mothers and all mothers should be more valued by society than any career woman ever could be. This positive spin on motherhood, with implied emphasis on heterosexual motherhood, rallied her supporters to her cause. Schlafly rejected lesbianism and women's liberationists, and although they could become – and in some cases are – mothers, the negative light Schlafly shined on their lifestyle pushed her conservative supporters further toward the right on the issue. Positive language was used both to illustrate how inherently immoral Schlafly believed the ERA was, as well as to show just how important women were to society.

In short, Schlafly knew how to manipulate her language to pull in her potential supporters or push away her enemies. By making logical and emotional appeals to her supporters' sense of morality and by tapping into their fears, such as she did by emphasizing the debate on women in the military, Schlafly was effectively manipulating her speech to meet the needs of her support base. She wished to be seen as positive, as evidenced by the title of her book, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, and constructive despite the fact that she

was attempting to deconstruct the ERA movement and to block its ratification. Solomon sums up the rhetorical implications of Schlafly and her STOP-ERA organization by stating, "Repeatedly, the group identifies itself as positive and affirmative, while the liberationists are portrayed as negative, destructive, and defeatist."⁵³ In the end, while many of the various feminist groups who opposed Schlafly emphasized the negative effects of non-ratification of the ERA, Schlafly came out on top in part because she thoroughly emphasized the positive aspects of not ratifying the ERA. Her strongest point became an emphasis on Schlafly's portrayal of women as already "superior." To have equality between men and women forced on them would be a downturn in Schlafly's view.⁵⁴ In the eyes of the general public, and eventually even to many in the mainstream media, the power of the "Positive Woman" won out.

Conclusion

In mid-1982, the women's liberation movement, or feminism as it prefers to be called, suddenly became passé.⁵⁵

The above statement is the first sentence from Schlafly's *Feminist Fantasies*, published in 2001. In those eighteen words are all the markings of Phyllis Schlafly: bold, loud, intelligent, and yet still slightly off the mark. Her classic characteristic shines through – mislabeling an entire category of women called "feminists" under the label of a subgroup, "women's liberationists," who caused more controversy than they did real change in American society.

⁵² Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 11.

⁵³ Solomon, "The Rhetoric of STOP-ERA," 55.

⁵⁴ Schlafly, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, 33.

⁵⁵ Schlafly, *Feminist Fantasies*, 3.

It is hard to imagine what life would be like had Phyllis Schlafly decided not to, at the request of one her close friends, debate a feminist supporter of the ERA in Connecticut in the early months of 1972.⁵⁶ At that moment in time the passage of the ERA seemed a sure thing. It had already passed the whole of Congress and was ratified by thirty states, just eight states shy of the three-fourths majority needed to add it as an amendment to the Constitution. But Phyllis Schlafly changed all that, and by June 30, 1982, more than ten long years later, the feminist movement was reeling from the blow. The ERA did not pass, and it became the first constitutional amendment to get ratified by the Congress and yet still not get amended to the Constitution.

As shown through the entirety of the paper, even feminists sometimes had to marvel at Schlafly's tenacity. Through hard work, determination, and a seemingly bottomless well of energy and ideas, Schlafly was able to hold off the ratification of the ERA despite a Congressional reprieve that forced the fight to last three years longer than it originally should have. Though some of her arguments seemed preposterous – she claimed many times that the passage of the ERA would de-segregate the sexes, thus opening the door to issues such as unisex public restrooms⁵⁷ – others, like her arguments against women in the military, seemed just logical enough to win over many like-minded conservative women activists to support her cause.

Phyllis Schlafly was, without a doubt, one of the most deservedly controversial public figures of late-20th century United States politics because she expressed her views so loudly, so openly, and so often to anyone that would listen. And, while this

⁵⁶ Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, 240.

⁵⁷ "What the Equal Rights Amendment Means," *Phyllis Schlafly Report*, January 1973, 3.

paper does not tend to view Schlafly as a positive figure in women's activism, it does not deny the fact that one still has to marvel at her accomplishment: Schlafly brought down the ERA at a time when no one believed that it could be stopped.

This paper intended to show how Schlafly moved from her relatively impoverished beginnings in St. Louis to national renown through her fight against the ERA. She was a model for conservative women and women of the New Right, and a conundrum for the women of the feminist movement, because she exhibited so many different skills and abilities that both found beneficial: poise, grace, intelligence, education, and maternal characteristics above all else. She was able to actively and successfully oppose the ERA by tapping into a growing number of conservative women who, much like Schlafly herself, based their political views upon their moral ideologies. To these women, Schlafly served as a model citizen because of her status as mother as well as her status as crusader against injustices done by the liberal movement to what these women perceived to be the solid, moral foundation of America. Schlafly was also deft at manipulating both her organization, STOP-ERA, and her language to force both to suit her needs. She portrayed her supporters as heterosexual, moral, maternal, superior, and central in the righteous household, while she couched her enemies in a negative light by labeling them lesbians and speaking of them as wishing to undo the moral fabric of American society.

The fundamental question in any discussion concerning either Schlafly or the ERA is whether or not the United States would be better had the ERA been ratified. Unfortunately, the answer will remain fodder for speculation, in large part due to the efforts of Phyllis Schlafly and her STOP-ERA supporters. They are forever

etched in to the history of the ERA as the group that did the impossible, and to many, the unthinkable – they blocked the equality of the sexes. Until the ERA goes through the ratification process again – as many in the feminist world are still hoping it will – we will never know if some of Schlafly's ideas about its ramifications were true. Will we ever be subject to unisex public toilets? Will women become subject to the military draft, if indeed another draft takes place? Or will it simply mean that women will finally be afforded the respect and equality that they have long deserved and been denied? Only time will tell.

THE ROOTS OF MULTICULTURALISM

Stephanie Braun

“One of the illusions created by the advent of postmodern theory was the misleading impression that [multiculturalism] had somehow liberated the multiple identities in us all.”¹ Instead, multiculturalism acted and continues to act as an economic catalyst in this time of globalizing businesses. According to Tammy Bruce, writer of *The New Thought Police: Inside the Left’s Assault on Free Speech and Free Minds*, “Multiculturalism seeks to destroy this unique American culture by dividing groups into separate tribes, each celebrating only itself and viewing other groups—especially anything Western—as the enemy.”² Dinesh D’Souza, author of *The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society*, writes that many individuals in favor of multiculturalism and diversity oppose Western values. He also writes that the rise of these Western values is “connected to the evolution of three systems: science, representative self-

government, and capitalism.”³ The irony arises, when the Western enemy, whom many multiculturalists strongly and vocally oppose, “Corporate America,” perpetuates multicultural education through its increased demand for culturally-aware individuals. “In a literal way, business revenues and prosperity began depending more and more on corporations’ ability to handle culturally divergent groups of buyers and sellers. For these purposes, having a culturally and racially varied work force began to make good business sense.”⁴ This logic begs the question: where might one go about attaining a “culturally and racially varied work force” with knowledge of multicultural education? The answer lies within virtually every campus in the nation – the students. Therefore, one may logically conclude that America’s economy is a driving factor emphasizing multicultural education. This is evident from both the business and university perspectives.

A February 12, 2002 article from Entrepreneur.com offers the suggestion to “use your employees as a focus group for markets they may be more familiar with.”⁵ This article continues to say, “For example: If you’re targeting minority markets, look to your employees for help. Is your workforce multicultural? Ask employees for advice on going after the markets they know. Involve them in planning your advertising campaigns and promotions to those markets. Let them serve as your focus group for new products and services geared to minority

¹ Allen Chun, “The Grand Illusion: The Long History of Multiculturalism in an Era of Invented Indigenization,” *Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei, Taiwan* at http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cache:ne74p6mLUaEJ:www.international.ucla.edu/cira/paper/TW_Chun_Allen.pdf+is+multiculturalism+driven+by+the+economy&hl=en&ie=UTF-8; accessed 11 November 2003.

² Tammy Bruce, *The New Thought Police: Inside the Left’s Assault on Free Speech and Free Minds* (Roseville, Cal.: Forum, 2001), 148.

³ Dinesh D’Souza, *The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 49.

⁴ Gary Gerstle, *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 356.

⁵ “303 Marketing Tips Guaranteed to Boost Your Business: Let Your Employees Do the Work,” *Entrepreneur.com*, 12 February 2002 at <http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/0,4621,297041,00.html>; accessed 11 November 2003.

markets. Reward employees when their ideas pay off.”⁶ This helpful suggestion blatantly asks if one’s workforce is multicultural, and not so subtly implies that minorities should be hired for a corporation’s marketing positions when targeting minority demographics.

Universities also promote the value of a multicultural education when a recent graduate is searching the job market. The Career Services page of the Arizona State University website explains, “Today’s marketplace requires skills in addition to college degrees and work experience.”⁷ Persons who possess such skills are considered “valued candidates for employment.”⁸ Multiculturalism is present on this list of skills. The site reads, “Individuals with multicultural skills work well with people from varying backgrounds and cultures. Speaking a second or third language is a very desirable skill; having knowledge of culture and social etiquette is an additional positive quality.”⁹ In order to verify that multiculturalism is indeed a desired trait of employers, one need only visit Monster.com and type in the word *multicultural*. Nearly 200 jobs descriptions will appear, including a want ad for a Boston, Massachusetts-based position as a Director of Creative Services. This \$120,000 - \$150,000/year salaried position emphasizes that “multicultural experience [is] also a strong plus.”¹⁰

Clearly, businesses value multicultural knowledge. As boundaries seem to dissolve across a global economy, new and diverse markets are within the grasp of marketers nearly anywhere in the world. However, marketing to these audiences is not as simple as it may appear. Many businesses have ignorantly attempted to penetrate diverse markets with little if any understanding of their potential customers’ native culture and language. This is evident in the seemingly endless list of botched advertisements that have been lost in the translation. Recently, Pizza Hut began advertising a new dish, a calzone they named the P’Zone ®.¹¹ The company decided to market this food item to a Spanish-speaking population only to discover that P’Zone ®, pronounced “pezón,” is the Spanish word for “nipple.”¹² In a similar experience, American Airlines reached out to the Mexican market with their “Fly in Leather” campaign. Much to their dismay, “Vuela en Cuero” took on a new meaning when “Fly in Leather” was literally translated to mean “Fly Naked.”¹³ A similar issue arises with the American Dairy Association’s famous, “Got Milk?” advertising campaign. Despite its success in the United States, the ad did not take off in the Mexican market with its Spanish translation of, “Are you Lactating?”¹⁴ “Turn it loose,” a famous slogan from Coors was translated into Spanish and resulted in

⁶ “303 Marketing Tips,” *Entrepreneur.com*.

⁷ “Career Services,” *Arizona State University* at <http://career.asu.edu/S/LA/Skills/LASkillscritical.htm> accessed 11 November 2003.

⁸ “Career Services,” *Arizona State University*.

⁹ “Career Services,” *Arizona State University*.

¹⁰ “US-MA-Boston-Director of Creative Services,” *Monster.com* at <http://jobsearch.diversity.monster.com/getjob.asp?JobID=19385968&AVSDM=2003%2D10%2D06+16%3A40%3A00&Logo=1&col=dlteci&cy=&brd=3902&lid=&fn=&q=multicultural>; accessed 11 November 2003.

¹¹ “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” *118nGuy Home Page* at <http://www.i18nguy.com/translations.html>; accessed 11 November 2003.

¹² “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” *118nGuy Home Page*.

¹³ “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” *118nGuy Home Page*.

¹⁴ “Lost in the Translation,” *Department of Advertising at the University of Texas at Austin: Advertising Research Resource Center* at <http://advertising.utexas.edu/research/humor/lost.htm> accessed 23 October 2003.

“suffer from diarrhea.”¹⁵ Parker Pens encourages its Mexican consumers to purchase their ballpoint pen because “It won’t leak in your pocket and embarrass you.” Unfortunately, the company unwittingly selected the word, “embarazar,” assuming that it meant “embarrassed,” and not “pregnant.” In reality, their customers were informed to buy Parker Pens because “It won’t leak in your pocket and make you pregnant.”¹⁶ A final example of botched advertising within the Spanish-speaking market includes an American t-shirt maker who attempted to promote an upcoming Papal visit. While he thought the t-shirt read, “I saw the Pope,” the shirts actually proclaimed “I saw the Potatoe.”¹⁷ While there are many other ads that wasted a great deal of their marketers’ money, a final ad lost in its translation into Spanish includes the “terrible mangled”¹⁸ Chicken-man Frank Perdue’s slogan, “It takes a tough man to make a tender chicken.”¹⁹ Mr. Perdue is pictured with one of his chickens on billboards throughout the country of Mexico explaining that “It takes a hard man to make a chicken aroused.”²⁰

This type of failed advertising is present everywhere, not just in attempted English-to-Spanish translations. Kentucky Fried Chicken ran into translation problems within the Chinese market with their “Finger Lickin’ Good” chicken. To their horror they discovered that their slogan “finger lickin’

good” came out as “eat your fingers off.”²¹ Another Chinese market mishap occurred a few years ago when the slogan, “Come Alive with the Pepsi Generation” was literally translated to mean “Pepsi Brings Your Ancestors Back from the Grave.”²²

Despite the above examples, it is not always translation issues that act as barriers of entry into a foreign marketplace. In the case of Gerber Baby Food, “when they first started selling baby food in Africa, they used the same packaging as here in the USA – with the cute baby on the label. Later they found that in Africa, companies routinely put pictures on the label of what’s inside since most people can’t read.”²³ In other words, sales did not take off until after a label change because African customers thought Gerber was selling baby in a jar.

Obviously, businesses have had their share of marketing failures because of a lack of cultural awareness. While each of these stories may seem like a very entertaining anecdote, it can be assumed that in addition to the millions of dollars and months upon months of time wasted due to improper planning, each of these companies also publicly embarrassed themselves in a manner that required additional funding and time to correct. Logically, corporations, ever conscious of their bottom line, must break the cycle of culturally inept marketing with the not-so-secret weapon of hiring culturally aware individuals. Contrarily, author Dinesh D’Souza contends that minorities are solely hired for the purposes of meeting certain affirmative action quotas. In other words, businesses hire certain individuals not for their ethnic insight but for their ethnic pigmentation. In his book,

¹⁵ “Lost in the Translation.”

¹⁶ “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” [I18nGuy Home Page](#).

¹⁷ “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” [I18nGuy Home Page](#).

¹⁸ “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” [I18nGuy Home Page](#).

¹⁹ “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” [I18nGuy Home Page](#).

²⁰ “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” [I18nGuy Home Page](#).

²¹ “Lost in the Translation,” *Department of Advertising*.

²² “Marketing Translation Mistakes,” [I18nGuy Home Page](#).

²³ “Lost in the Translation,” *Department of Advertising*.

The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society, D'Souza explains, "Racial preferences are now widespread in private sector job hiring. Pressured by the government as well as by internal minority constituencies, the vast majority of companies now give preference to black and Hispanic applicants both in hiring and promotion in order to meet affirmative action goals and targets."²⁴

Given that there are a number of government pressures at play, including affirmative action and other anti-discrimination programs, in coordination with hiring preference given to Hispanics and blacks, one may conclude as D'Souza does that the two go hand in hand. I, however, disagree. There is more to this situation than corporations simply adhering to government persuasion for the sake of entertaining some equal opportunity ideology. No, corporations stand to make a great profit with the aid of these individuals. Upon further investigation, one would discover that the Hispanic and black markets are greatly increasing in both buying power and sheer number, and businesses would be foolish not to hire members from both demographic groups to aid in increasing their customer bases.

According to MarketResearch.com, "Hispanics are now the largest minority group in the U.S. Many businesses are discovering that this segment of the population is an *important part of the customer base*, and since it is growing at a rapid rate, it will be even more important in the future. But for many companies, the Hispanic population is not well understood, making it difficult to market to them."²⁵

²⁴ D'Souza, *The End of Racism*, 291.

²⁵ "Hispanic Spending and Shopping Patterns – US: Report Summary," *MarketResearch.com*, 1 August 2003 at <http://www.marketresearch.com/map/prod/924635.html>; accessed 25 November 2003.

The summary report continues to explain that buying patterns differ between native-born Hispanics and those who immigrated into the United States. Who would be more qualified to work within a marketing campaign targeting either of these rapidly growing customer bases than perhaps some of these culturally aware Hispanic customers themselves?

In another report summary entitled, *The U.S. African Market*, MarketResearch.com states, "Over the past two decades the buying power of African American households has more than doubled and has grown 50% faster than that of the U.S. population as a whole. Other key social and economic indicators—such as homeownership and college enrollment—are also improving at above-average rates for African Americans. Another factor in the rising affluence of African Americans is a noticeable increase in the number of high-income, married-couple African American families. As a result of these long-term trends, more and more African American households are achieving middle- and upper-income status."²⁶ For only \$3,325, a business can receive a full report indicating how to best penetrate this market, indicating there is money to be made by those who understand how different cultures spend money in America.

These two report summaries help show that it is more than mere coincidence that the two fastest growing groups (blacks and Hispanics), whose buying power seems to be ever increasing, are now hired more often than in the past. They have grown considerably in their profitability within the past few years, and it would seem rather unusual at this point if American companies

²⁶ Packaged Facts, "The U.S. African-American Market, 5th Edition," *MarketResearch.com*, 1 January 2004 at <http://www.marketresearch.com/map/prod/888595.html>; accessed 25 November 2003.

did not have marketing agendas specifically tailored to gain market share within both demographic groups. Therefore, while job qualifications and affirmative action quotas do affect who is hired for various positions, it is undeniable that these individuals are also hired because of their much-desired cultural awareness of particular target markets.

Corporate new hires who reach out to the black and Hispanic markets must attain their multicultural knowledge from somewhere. In addition to individuals who were born and raised within a culture, many individuals must be educated about a culture's language, etiquette, and so on. This is where university-based multicultural education comes into play. "Put simply, the capitalist economy has driven education, producing an educational system that serves capitalism fairly well,"²⁷ and multicultural abilities are now what serve our economy quite well. After reading many college websites, it is apparent that multicultural education has taken on a strong role in academia. This is clear through its availability as a major, minor, concentration, or specialization.

Bethany College of Lindsborg, Kansas offers a Multicultural Studies minor;²⁸ and National-Louis University, located in Chicago, Illinois, offers a Multicultural major.²⁹ Nazareth College of Rochester, New York, allows students to partake in a

²⁷ Jerry D. Johnson, "Reading, Writing, and Justice: School Reform as if Democracy Really Matters," *Education Review*, 10 April 2000 at <http://edrev.asu.edu/reviews/rev90.htm>; accessed 11 November 2003.

²⁸ "Multicultural Studies Minor," *Bethany College* at http://www.bethanylb.edu/academics/degree_requirements/multicultural_studies_major.html; accessed 28 November 2003.

²⁹ "Multicultural Studies," *National-Louis University* at <http://www3.nl.edu/academics/cas/las/multiculturalstudies.cfm>; accessed 28 November 2003.

Multicultural Studies concentration;³⁰ while Sonoma State University of Rohnert Park, California, allows for both an American Multicultural major and minor.³¹ Sonoma explains that the goal of these programs is to help students "act as a bridge between different cultural groups," and that this "major prepares individuals to function effectively in the fields of personnel administration, business, law, human resources, and public relations."³² The Evangelical University in Springfield, Missouri, provides an International and Multicultural Studies major, concentration, and minor.³³ St. Olaf College based in Northfield, Minnesota, offers an American Racial & Multicultural Studies major.³⁴ A student can major in Ethnic Studies at either California State University, Sacramento, or at the University of Oregon in Eugene.³⁵ Foothill College of Los Altos Hills, California, clarifies that their Ethnic Studies major "offers curriculum diversity desired

³⁰ "Multicultural Studies Program: Concentration," *Nazareth College* at http://www.naz.edu/dept/multic_studies/concentration_courses.html; accessed 28 November 2003.

³¹ "American Multicultural Studies," *Sonoma State University* at <http://www.sonoma.edu/depts/amcs/>; accessed 28 November 2003.

³² "American Multicultural Studies," *Sonoma State University*.

³³ "International and Multicultural Studies," *Evangelical University* at <http://www.evangel.edu/General/Catalog/SocialSciences/InternationalAndMulticulturalStudies.asp>; accessed 28 November 2003.

³⁴ "American Racial & Multicultural Studies," *St. Olaf College* at http://www.stolaf.edu/depts/arms/arms/is_it_possible_to_double_major.html#double; accessed 28 November 2003.

³⁵ "Ethnic Studies: Program Description," *California State University, Sacramento* at <http://aaweb.csus.edu/catalog/current/PROGRAM/ETHN.asp>; accessed 29 November 2003. "Ethnic Studies: About the Program," *University of Oregon*, June 2003 at <http://www.uoregon.edu/~ethnic/>; accessed 29 November 2003.

by employers seeking employees specializing in ethnic studies. Career areas that welcome a four-year college/university degree in this major include government research firms, business and human resources management offices, multinational corporations, and public administration.” Specific concentrations within the major include African-American and Hispanic/Latino American.³⁶

Multicultural Studies as a minor, major, or specialization are available at St. Ambrose University of Davenport, Iowa, the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and Sienna College of Loudonville, New York.³⁷ California State Polytechnic University of Pomona, California, has a Gender, Ethnicity, and Multicultural Studies major whereas California State University, Chico, has devoted an entire center for Multicultural and Gender Studies; at this university, a student may choose from two majors and seven minors within the Multicultural and Gender Studies program.³⁸ At the University of Findlay, in Findlay, Ohio, a student has the opportunity to take Bilingual Multicultural Studies, also known as a Language for Business major. This combination, double major consists of Spanish, Japanese, or another approved language major in addition to the

³⁶ “Foothill College Business & Social Science Division: Ethnic Studies Associate in Arts Degree Curriculum Requirements,” *Foothill College* at <http://www.foothill.edu/programs/ethnic.pdf>; accessed 28 November 2003.

³⁷ “Multicultural Studies,” *St. Ambrose University* at <http://library.sau.edu/bestinfo/Majors/MultCult/mulindex.htm>; accessed 28 November 2003.

³⁸ “What can I do with a major in...Gender, Ethnicity, and Multicultural Studies,” *Cal Poly Pomona* at http://www.csupomona.edu/~advising/pdf/gems_1.pdf; accessed 28 November 2003. “Center for Multicultural and Gender Studies,” *California State University, Chico*, 24 May 2003 at <http://www.csuchico.edu/mcgs/programs.html>; accessed 28 November 2003.

“requirements for one of the business minors.”³⁹

At Google.com, 280,000 sites appear when the words “multicultural,” “studies,” “major,” and “business” were entered into the search section. Many of these sites indicate that graduation with degrees in these majors will open up business opportunities in fields including public relations, management, and human resources. Just as businesses increased their demand for new hires with computer skills and schools adjusted accordingly by teaching their students certain computer skills, this fairly recent wave of multicultural education is no different. Schools are accommodating big business to increase their graduates’ hiring potential (and then use these statistics to draw new students to their universities). D’Souza can try to pass off the act of businesses hiring multicultural individuals as simply meeting government regulations but this does not take into account the growing number of universities that teach their students multicultural skills.

Tammy Bruce believes multiculturalism will eventually destroy the unique American culture. No, our unique American culture is based on enterprising capitalistic ideals, and multiculturalism has become yet another enterprising facet of the American culture. In fact, multiculturalism has become a business in and of itself; those working within this fresh multi-billion dollar industry call it “Managing Diversity.”⁴⁰ For \$5,295 per person, one can attend the American Institute for Managing Diversity, Inc., Corporate Executive Series, in order to learn to “access varied talents and perspectives and challenge conventional wisdom when attacking complex business challenges,” as

³⁹ “Language for Business,” *University of Findlay*, at <http://www.findlay.edu/academics/cola/blmc/requirements/business.html>; accessed 28 November 2003.

⁴⁰ D’Souza, *The End of Racism*, 326.

well as “manage complex non-traditional diversity mixtures and tensions” associated with “global expansion.”⁴¹ Companies invest a great deal of money into these diversity initiatives because they and their stockholders anticipate a larger return.

Returning to the original idea of botched advertising, let us look at the potential of a company that has fully taken advantage of culturally competent employees: General Motors. On July 24, 2002, “General Motors kicked off an integrated marketing campaign targeting Hispanic consumers for the Chevy TrailBlazer EXT.”⁴² Targeting the five major Hispanic cities, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Miami, and San Antonio, GM’s “Fair on Wheels” attracted Hispanic people and their families to play games and view the Chevy TrailBlazer and TrailBlazer EXT. GM demonstrated knowledge of the Spanish language, family life, and culture. “The venues... [featured] Spanish-speaking product specialists.”⁴³ In a press release, they indicated, “Research has shown us that Hispanics are quite similar to general market consumers in that they want safe, top-quality, high-performance products. Where they differ is in purchase motivation; Hispanics buy based on what is best for their family.”⁴⁴ As mentioned above, one could pay thousands of dollars to attain a Hispanic demographic report explaining the culture’s strong family focus, or they could hire Hispanic individuals to work on their marketing team.

⁴¹ “Introducing the Corporate Executive Series: A Vital Opportunity for Top Leaders,” *American Institute for Managing Diversity Inc.*, at <http://aimd.org/nonprofit/aimd/corporate/>; accessed 29 November 2003.

⁴² “General Motors Launches Hispanic Grassroots Campaign in Support of New Trailblazer EXT,” *Hispanic PR Wire*, 24 July 2002 at http://www.hispanicprwire.com/release_GM_ENG.html; accessed 25 November 2003.

⁴³ “General Motors,” *Hispanic PR Wire*.

⁴⁴ “General Motors,” *Hispanic PR Wire*.

GM realized that Hispanic households “are generally larger than average” and therefore would have a need for “the third-row seating which allows the TrailBlazer EXT to seat seven.”⁴⁵ Additionally, “General Motors commissioned a painting from Mexican artist Yolanda Garza Morales. The painting was made into a poster that will be sold at each mall tour destination with all proceeds going to the Hispanic Scholarship Fund. The Hispanic Scholarship fund has granted over 53,000 scholarships totaling more than \$89 million to Hispanic students since 1975, making it the largest Hispanic scholarship granting organization in the U.S.”⁴⁶

Only time will tell if GM’s multicultural efforts will have paid off; however, it is a safe assumption to state that a great deal of time and effort was spent acquiring much knowledge about this market. As the Hispanic and black markets are growing at an unprecedented rate, General Motors and other businesses must ensure that they are hiring individuals who understand these and other cultures. Customers are the lifeblood of businesses. As their numbers and buying power change, so must businesses change with them. This is accomplished through the perpetuation of multicultural education.

⁴⁵ “General Motors,” *Hispanic PR Wire*.

⁴⁶ “General Motors,” *Hispanic PR Wire*.