Source: Angle, Jerome. Words That Made America Great.. New
York: Random House, 1997.
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Minors of the Negro race, throughout their legal representatives,
seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public
schools of their community on a non-segregated basis. In each
instance, they have been denied admission to schools attended
by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation
according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In each of these cases other than the Delaware Case,
a three-judge Federal District Court denied relief to the plaintiffs
on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine announced
by this court in the Plessy vs. Feguson 163 U.S. 537. Under that
doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are
provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities
be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware
adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted
to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro
schools.
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively
consideration of the amendment in Congress, ratification by the
states, then-existing practices in racial segregation , and the
views of the proponents and opponents of the amendment.
This discussion and our own investigation convince us that,
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve
the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive.
. .
The doctrine of “separate but equal” did not make
its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy
vs. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation.
American courts have since been labored with the doctrine for
over half a century. . .
Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison
of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved
in each of these cases. We must look instead to the effect of
segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy
vs. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American
life throughout the nation. Only in this way can it be determined
if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of
the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of the
state and local governments. Compulsory school-attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.
It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may be reasonable
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms . . .
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate education
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any
discussion where segregation also violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability
of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions,
the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of
considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate
relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary questions—the
constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have
now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection
of the laws.
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